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In recent years, the Department of Defense has been plagued by cost overruns and 
schedule slippages in major software development projects. As a result, the performance of 
managers on software development projects has come under increasing scrutiny. Despite this 
scrutiny, little attention has been paid to the decision processes of software project managers. 
The goal of this project was to conduct micro-empirical research into managers' decision 
processes, thereby gaining a greater understanding of the ways in which managers make 
decisions. The project used a simulation of a real NASA software project and verbal protocol 
analysis techniques to capture the decision processes of seven professional software project 
managers. Methods of analysis were adapted and developed to trace and explore the captured 
protocols. Specifically, each subject's decision processes were traced and compared to a nominal 
model of the decision environment and compared to other subjects. 
It was found that, despite their experience, the subjects generally had difficulty 
developing mental models which accurately captured all of the complex relationships in the 
software management environment. The quality assurance sub-system proved especially 
difficult. The observed difficulties with the quality assurance decision would prove detrimental 
to real-world software projects and should be investigated further. 
Additionally, it was noted that managers tend to place a greater emphasis on meeting 
schedule goals than cost. Also, more experienced managers tend to rely on specific data, make 
fewer changes, and are less able or willing to verbalize their thoughts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.       DISCUSSION 
One need not look far to see the tremendous price/performance advances in computer 
hardware. Software development on the other hand, has not fared as well. The literature is rife 
with examples of software projects gone awry. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports 
that cost overruns and schedule slippages are a way of life in the Department Of Defense (DOD). 
Even when completed, many systems fail to meet technical requirements, and thus are of little 
value to the user (GAO, 1989). While efforts are under way in DOD to improve processes, 
management failures are still evident in DOD Information Technology acquisition. For example, 
a recent GAO report on the Continuous Acquisition and Lifecycle Support Initiative portrays the 
program "in disarray" after spending $5 billion in the past 10 years (GAO, 1994). 
The root of most problems in major Information Technology system procurements is 
poor software development. Frederick Brooks compares the software development process to the 
pre-historic tar pits that were the demise of many great beasts (Brooks, 1975). Contributing to 
the software management problem is an annual growth in demand of 25 per cent compared to a 4 
per cent growth in the number of trained programmers (Kitfield, 1989). To overcome this 
disparity, managers must simply make better decisions faster. For that to happen, a greater 
understanding of the software project managers' decision processes and their limitations is 
required. 
Clearly then, there is room for improvement in the software management process in both 
government and private sectors. This thesis presents a micro-empirical analysis of the decision 
making behavior of software project managers. Specifically, an experiment using verbal protocol 
analysis was conducted to trace the decision processes of software project managers, and 
methods developed to analyze the results. The experiment consisted of recording subjects as 
they thought out-loud while managing a simulated software project from start to finish. The 








B.       PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
This study explored the decision processes of software project management. By 
conducting this study and answering the primary research questions, a clearer understanding of 
how software project managers make decisions was attained. The benefit of a better 
understanding of any decision process is the ability to positively influence the outcome of the 
process. By understanding the intricacies of the decision processes involved in software 
management, better tools, information, measures, and systems may be developed to support the 
decisions. This will result in better decisions and ultimately higher quality software, developed 
at a lower cost. 
1. Primary Research Questions 
This research was intended to explore the decision making processes of software project 
managers. Being exploratory in nature, the exact outcome of the research was difficult to 
predict. However, in general, this research sought to answer the questions: 
.   How do experienced software project managers make decisions? 
• Do software project managers' cognitive maps of the decision environment 
accurately portray the causal web that comprises the actual environment? 
• What commonalties exist between individual managers decision processes? 
• Are managers consistent in their own decision processes? 
2. Scope of Research 
Using an existing simulation based on the Systems Dynamic Model (SDM) of Software 
Project Management (Swett, 1995; Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1990), an experiment was 
designed and executed to extract the decision processes of experienced software project 
managers using verbal protocol analysis. Methods to analyze those protocols were developed to 
answer the primary research questions. 
3. Limitations 
Protocol analysis is an extremely time intensive research method. As such, the primary 
limit to this research was time. Therefore, some methods of analysis are developed here, but 
their full implementation is left for future studies. 
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C.       THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter I provides an overview of the purpose 
and scope of the research. In Chapter II, a brief review of pertinent literature is discussed. A 
working background in decision theory and software project management is developed. Chapter 
III provides a detailed discussion of the design and execution of the experiment. The methods of 
analysis are then discussed. Chapter IV details the results of the analysis described in the 





II. THEORETICAL PREMISE 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Decisions are often made difficult by the complex, dynamic systems or environments in 
which they are made. One such environment envelops software project managers. This research 
project is intended to explore how software project managers make decisions in the complex 
system of software development. Towards that end, this chapter will first demonstrate the 
complexity of the software management environment. This is accomplished by fitting the 
characteristics of an existing model of the software development environment to characteristics 
of a general complex system. The last section will provide a review of verbal protocol analysis 
as a means of conducting decision research. The need for expert subjects in decision research is 
also presented. 
B. SOFTWARE PROJECT MANAGEMENT - A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
Software management is a complex system. While this is self-evident, it is worth 
exploring the specific characteristics of software project management which make it complex. 
This section will present characteristics of a complex system in a general sense, then match those 
with specific characteristics of software project management. 
Funke (1991) defines complex problem solving or decision making in terms of several 
criteria. Briefly, he characterizes problem solving in complex systems by the following: 
• Intransparency - Not all variables are observable. Frequently, only symptoms 
are apparent. 
• Polytely - Multiple and conflicting goals exist for the decision maker. 
• Connectivity of variables - Changes in one variable change many other 
variables, making it difficult to conceptualize all consequences. 
• Dynamic developments - Spontaneous changes occur in the situation or system, 
requiring immediate action by the problem solver. 
• Time delayed effects - Effects of certain actions are frequently delayed. This is 
in direct contradiction to the immediate action required by system dynamics. 
Recognizing the need for micro-empirical research in the field of software project 
management, a series of studies have been conducted on the effects of various environmental 
factors on the decisions made by software managers (Hardebeck, 1991; Abdel-Hamid, 1992; 
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Abdel-Hamid et. al., 1993; Baker, 1992; Bosley, 1994; Swett, 1995). These experiments were all 
conducted using graduate students as subjects, and a simulation interface and model built in 
Dynamo. The simulation model is a mathematical representation of the Systems Dynamics 
Model (SDM) of software project management (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1989,1990). 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick's model accounts for literally hundreds of variables and their 
complex interrelationships. In the following bullets, examples from the SDM will be cited to 
demonstrate how the various characteristics of complex systems presented by Funke (1991) 
apply to the software management environment. 
• Intransparency - While many of the hundreds of variables in the software 
management system are frequently invisible to the manager simply because of 
the number of variables in the system, perhaps nowhere is this more evident 
than in the QA sector (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1990). While a manager 
should be aware of the number of defects discovered, it is no surprise that the 
actual number of defects will never be known. Likewise, the manager will 
never know the actual amount of the project completed at any given time, or 
the exact amount of communication overhead affecting productivity. 
• Polytely - Multiple conflicting goals are the very heart of any management 
problem, especially the software management problem. Swett (1995) 
demonstrated the conflicting nature of two simple sets of goals: minimize cost 
overruns vs. minimize schedule overruns, and minimize schedule overruns vs. 
maximize quality. When adding in the plethora of other goals facing the 
project manager, the complexity is magnified exponentially. 
• Connectivity of variables - A review of the various sectors of Abdel-Hamid's 
model will leave little doubt regarding the connected nature of the variables in 
this process. Hiring delay illustrates the point clearly. In the Human Resource 
Management Subsystem (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1990), hiring delays 
dictate the newly hired workforce and therefore the total workforce. Total 
workforce then influences manpower available for QA and development in the 
Manpower allocation sector, as well as directly impacting productivity in the 
Productivity Sub-sector. Meanwhile, in the Planning Subsystem, willingness 
to change workforce is effected and thus the actual workforce level sought. 
When compounded by assimilation delays, which account for the time a new 
hire needs to become savvy on the given project, the effects are nearly 
incomprehensible. 
• Time delayed effects - Two of the highest impact time delay effects have 
already been discussed: hiring delay and assimilation delay. Others include 
the delay in incorporating newly discovered tasks, delays in adjusting job size, 
and exhaustion depletion delay time. (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1990) 
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•   Dynamic developments - Dynamic developments address the tendency of the 
project to spontaneously change. Again this characterizes the many unforeseen 
developments in any management project, but is most pronounced in the 
software realm in the area of requirements. The literature is rife with examples 
of projects where requirements doubled during the development cycle. Indeed, 
the exception would be the project in which requirements did not change. 
Sterman (1994) further elaborates on the impact of time delays on the decision process. 
He also notes that dynamic complexities not only limit the ability of decision makers to 
effectively cope in a dynamic system, but also impede learning by causing misperceptions of 
feedback. By misinterpreting feedback, decision makers reinforce dysfunctional behavior, and 
fail to learn from their mistakes. 
C.        DECISION RESEARCH USING VERBAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
This section will discuss some fundamentals of decision research and review literature 
pertinent to the analysis used in this research. 
1. Decision Research 
The field of decision research is extremely complex and widely diverse. Available 
literature is so extensive that a comprehensive review is infeasible. However, a partial review of 
the literature consulted in preparation of this experiment is appropriate. Specifically, that body 
of work dealing with verbal protocol analysis will be explored. 
Much of decision research involving protocol analysis is based on Ericsson and Simon's 
book, Protocol Analysis - Verbal Reports as Data (1984). Not only did this text summarize the 
work to date, it described detailed methods for collecting, reporting, and analyzing protocols. In 
short, it laid the foundation for current protocol analysis techniques. The methods developed by 
Ericsson and Simon were used extensively in this research, particularly in the execution of the 
experiment. 
Verbal protocol analysis involves the extraction and analysis of a subject's mental 
processes by recording a verbal description of the process. The description can be given either 
retrospectively or concurrently. While a detailed discussion of the two will not be provided here, 
concurrent verbalization was determined to be more appropriate for this research. Retrospective 
reporting depends more on unreliable long-term memory and has been shown to be more 
problematic on a number of fronts. It is important to note that collection of concurrent protocols 
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must be done carefully so as not to bias the subject's response. Basic instructions should be 
provided up front (see Chapter III), and only neutral comments by the researcher made to 
encourage verbalization during the actual experiment (Ericsson and Simon, 1984; Carroll and 
Johnson, 1990). 
In conducting protocol analysis, Svenson (1989) stressed the importance of a sound 
reference model. In her research, Svenson distinguishes between primitives used in the 
representation of the task and the coding scheme. She asserts that the reference model, or task 
representation, is a symbolic description of another system, with primitives being the smallest 
units in the system. A scheme for coding verbal protocols can be developed, based on that 
representation. The smallest units of the coding scheme may or may not be the same as the task 
primitives. This insight was used to develop the nominal model of the software management 
decision task environment. Svenson states: 
...Most verbal protocols actually contain a lot about the information 
processed and very little or nothing about how it is processed. Therefore it is 
important to have a good theory or model which makes it possible to understand 
the data in a process-oriented language. Very rarely do protocols themselves 
provide the theory for their understanding. Instead, the abundance of information 
tends to overwhelm the unsophisticated researcher, making it very difficult to find 
a structure for an understanding or explanation of the process that produced so 
much data. 
Providing even more specific guidance, Carroll and Johnson (1990) describe the steps in 
representing the task or, in their terms, completing the task analysis. 
It starts with the surface features of the decision by considering the 
decision maker, the alternatives to be chosen or judgments to be made, the 
information available to the decision maker, and the circumstances of the 
decision... The task analysis then goes deeper into the processes that are likely to 
occur as the decision is made. First, decision makers have a representation or 
mental image of the decision or judgment task, called a problem space, formed 
through the interaction of task information with prior knowledge. The researcher 
tries to specify the possible states of knowledge or contents of short-term memory 
that the decision maker might have. Second, the researcher identifies a set of 
goals and sub-goals for the decision, which correspond to the desired locations or 
directions in the problem space. Third, the researcher tries to specify a set of 
operators that act on the contents of short-term memory to create new knowledge 
or - in our terminology ~ move the decision maker from one point in the problem 
space to another.... 
8 
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Carroll and Johnson's strategy was essential in developing the nominal model of the task 
environment for this research (see Chapter III). The purpose of the nominal model is to provide 
a basis for comparison of subjects' decision processes. Decision processes are traced from the 
verbal protocols. The resulting process trace represents the subjects mental model or cognitive 
map of the decision environment. 
Sterman (1994) describes the role of mental models and how 'misperceptions of feedback' 
adversely affect peoples mental models. He further argues that human cognitive limitations 
make it difficult at best for people to 'simulate mentally even the simplest possible feedback 
system, the first-order linear feedback loop', and virtually impossible to grasp high-order, 
non-linear relationships, even when they are supplied with perfect knowledge of the system. 
This distinction between linear and non-linear relationships is key to our analysis of peoples 
cognitive maps, and how these models relate to the real world causal structure, which will be 
represented by our nominal model. For the purpose of this research, we will define linear 
relationships as causal chains, and non-linear relationships as causal webs. 
2. Analyzing Decision Protocols 
There are seemingly as many methods for analyzing protocols as there are experiments 
using them. Viewing protocol analysis as one type of process tracing, one review examined 45 
studies using various approaches to process tracing (Ford, et. al., 1989). Carroll and Johnson 
(1990) distinguish three categories of analysis: informal exploratory analysis, content analysis of 
statement frequencies, and construction of formal simulation models. This research will employ 
methods fitting the first two categories. 
The exploratory analysis involves simply transcribing and reading the protocol and 
making observations. It is most appropriate when only limited information exists about the task. 
While this may seem rudimentary, a large amount of information can be gained from exploratory 
analysis. Which attributes are used, the methods employed for combining attributes into 
judgments and decisions, and differences between subjects' decision processes (Carroll and 
Johnson, 1990) can all be discerned from observation. The analysis in this research goes slightly 
beyond mere observation, and compares a high level trace of each subject's processes to the task 
representation, yielding an even richer understanding of the decision processes. 
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Content analysis is more rigorous and intensive than exploratory analysis. It involves 
developing a coding scheme, segmenting the transcribed protocol into single complete thoughts, 
and finally coding each segment. Once coded, a number of analyses can be performed on the 
protocol; frequency, sequence, and transition to name a few (Carroll and Johnson, 1990). A 
coding scheme was developed for this experiment, but due to the nature of the research and time 
constraints, its use will be deferred to follow on research. 
While these categories of analysis are useful in a general sense, specific examples of 
techniques used in similar experiments provide further guidance in developing a method of 
analysis for this particular research. One study used verbal protocols to examine the option 
generation process and employed a number of different analysis techniques, including frequency 
and state/transition diagrams. In that study, the coding scheme was based on the SHOR 
(Stimulus-Hypothesis-Option-Response) paradigm. This paradigm recognizes decision makers 
as "problem solvers who gather information, generate causal hypotheses, and generate and 
evaluate options and take action on the basis of these hypotheses". Once coded, analysis of 
variance, frequency analysis, and state-transition analysis were conducted on the coded 
protocols. While the coding scheme did not translate directly to this experiment, it did provide a 
framework on which to base a coding scheme. The frequency and state-transition analysis were 
also useful. (Adelmann, et. al., 1995) 
Another experiment used verbal protocols and the UCLA Executive Decision Game to 
explore strategic business decision making. This study was similar in complexity to the decision 
tasks and environment found in software project management. This coding scheme provided 
valuable insight into coding causal relationships. The notion of differentiating light causal 
analysis from deep causal analysis was especially useful. (Schweiger, et. al., 1985) 
D.       THE NEED FOR EXPERTS 
As previously noted, past experiments have used graduate students with training in 
software management as subjects (Hardebeck, 1991; Abdel-Hamid, 1992; Abdel-Hamid et. al, 
1993; Baker, 1992; Bosley, 1994; Swett, 1995). Given that these experiments focused largely 
the results of the decision makers given different changes to the environment, this was 
acceptable. This research focuses on the process of decision makers, rather than the 
performance.    Studies show that the decision processes used by experts are quite unique. 
10 
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Camerer and Johnson (1991) note that experts use contingent search, search less, and use more 
knowledge in their decision making. Contingent searches refer to the behavior of experts in 
considering different sets of variables in different sequences, depending on the particular case. 
The special characteristics of the decision processes of experts make it desirable to use 
them in process research.    For this reason, this research used seven professional software 
managers as subjects. 
E.        CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In reviewing the literature, it is clear that software management is a difficult, complex 
process. While much has been done to explore the results of various filters on the decision 
makers performance, little research to date has sought to expose the processes decision makers 
use. What's more, no studies of experienced project managers were noted. Verbal protocol 
analysis is a method available to begin investigating these processes, and shows some promise in 
understanding the way managers view the decision problem. While a variety of techniques have 
been used to analyze verbal protocols, each research situation requires a unique approach to 







A.       CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
As stated, the purpose of this research was to gain a greater understanding of how 
software project managers make decisions. Towards that end, an experiment was designed to 
extract the protocols of ten professional software project managers, trace their decision 
processes, and analyze the results. Only seven of the ten subjects protocols were analyzed for 
reasons to be discussed later in the paper. 
The protocol extraction was accomplished by video taping each subject as they thought 
out loud while making decisions in a simulated software management environment. The audio 
portions of the recordings were transcribed for analysis. The video portions provided a useful 
reference for establishing context and for clarifying subjects' remarks when the audio was 
unclear. The simulated environment utilized a previously developed experimental interface to 
the Systems Dynamics Model (Swett, 1995). To allow subjects to become familiar with thinking 
out loud and with the interface, subjects were given practice sessions in verbalization and in 
using the interface. During the simulation, the values of each variable and each decision were 
extracted for later analysis. Following the simulation, each subject responded to a questionnaire 
in order to gain some additional information on demographics and feedback on the experiment. 
In order to trace the subjects' decisions, it was first necessary to develop a reference 
model of the decision environment. This model is referred to as a nominal map throughout this 
paper. The nominal map provided a basis for comparing the cognitive maps of the subjects. By 
reviewing the transcribed protocols, cognitive maps of each subject's decision process for each 
40 day period were developed. To facilitate a more rigorous analysis, an formal coding scheme 
was also developed. To provide a transcribed protocol to use in the development of the coding 
scheme, the experiment was administered to a trial subject. Due to time constraints, this coding 
scheme was developed but never used in this research. The scheme is presented here so that it 
may be used in future research. 
The actual analysis consisted of several steps. First, the final outcomes of individual 
experts were plotted. Individual outcomes were used to support general observations regarding 








variables of each subject was plotted for each period. Again these were used to identify general 
trends or phenomenon and to relate them to the demographics when possible. Finally, the maps 
of each subject were compared to each other and to the nominal map, and the results 
summarized. 
This Chapter will discuss the conduct of the experiment and the development of both the 
nominal map and the coding scheme. The analysis and results are presented in detail in Chapter 
IV. 
B.       THE EXPERIMENT 
In this experiment, subjects were required to manage an actual software project. The 
project profiled an actual NASA software project in which requirements grew over 50% during 
the course of the project. Management of the project consisted of making decisions on how large 
their total staff should be and what percentage of total staff should be allocated to QA. In 
addition, they were required to update their estimates for total project cost and duration 
(schedule). Decisions were based on information presented in six available screens. The screens 
consisted of three tables and three graphs. The tables presented status information, such as 
current requirements, reported progress, and reported productivity; staffing information including 
actual staff and experience level; and QA information including defect density and the QA 
expenditure rate. The graphs provided trends on selected variables from the three tables. 
Decisions were to be made at intervals of 40 working days. Swett (1995) provides a complete 
description of the interface and simulation environment. In addition to the information 
presented, subjects were given a specific goal of minimizing cost and schedule overruns. The 
requirements profile and goals matched one of four groups of students in the Swett experiment. 
This provided the basis for an expert versus student comparison. 
Prior to conducting the final simulation, it was necessary to allow subjects to practice 
thinking out loud and practice using the simulation interface. Both of these aspects of the 
experiment, as well as subject selection are discussed below. 
1. Subject Selection 
Ten subjects were initially chosen to conduct the actual experiment. They were selected 
based on their availability and experience. All ten subjects worked as software development 
managers in a medium size, scientific data collection and research facility.   After being given 
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based on their availability and experience. Al  ten subjects orked as software develop ent 
managers in a medium size, scientific data col ection and research facility. After being given 
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guidelines for subject qualifications, the facility selected subjects and relayed the names to the 
researchers. 
To reveal any bias in the background of the subjects, a detailed survey was developed and 
administered following the completion of the experiment. The survey and results are presented 
in Appendix A. A summary of the survey results pertaining to experience is shown in Table 1. 
Based on the results of the survey, the protocols of subjects 2 and 4 were not used in the analysis, 
since they had no experience in software project management, and failed to qualify as experts. 
Subject 
Number 
Age Years Managing 
Software Projects 
Type of Software Project 
Management Experience 
Education 
1 over 55 18 Semi-detached; FORTRAN, 




2 41-45 Development 
Only 
No management, development 
only 
AA/(CS) 
3 over 55 23 Semi-detached; FORTRAN; 
Mainframe, Super-Computer 
BS/MS/ PrePhD 
4 under 30 0 None BS(PhySci)/ 
MS(Ocean) 













8 46-50 17 Semi-detached; FORTRAN, 
Assembly, C; Super-Computer, 
Mainframe, Workstation 
BS(Eng) 
9 46-50 3 Semi-detached; FORTRAN, 




10 51-55 10 Embedded; FORTRAN; 
Mainframe, Workstation 
BS(Geol)/MBA 
Table 1. Subject Experience 
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2. Practice Verbalization 
Ericsson and Simon (1984, pp. 377-8) provide a sample of general instructions and 
practice problems to be used when gathering think-aloud reports.  The general instructions and 
first two practice problems used in this experiment were adapted for the particular task.  They 
were as follows: 
In this experiment, we are interested in learning what you think about 
when you make decisions at each step of the simulation. In order to do this, I am 
going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you work on the problem. What I mean 
by think aloud is that I want you to tell me EVERYTHING that you are thinking 
from the time you start the simulation until it is complete. I would like you to talk 
aloud CONSTANTLY through the entire simulation. I don't want you to try to 
plan out what to say or try to explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you 
are alone in the room speaking to yourself. It is most important that you keep 
talking. If you are silent for any long period of time, I will ask you to talk. Do 
you understand what I want you to do? 
Good, now we will begin with some practice problems. First, I want you 
to multiply these two numbers in your head and tell me what you are thinking as 
you get an answer. 
"What is the result of multiplying 24 x 36" 
Good. Now I will give you two more practice problems before we 
proceed with the experiment. I want you to do the same thing for each one of 
these problems. As before, I want you to think aloud as you think about the 
question. Any questions? Now, here is your next problem. 
"How many windows are there in your parents house?" 
These two practice problems were followed with a more in depth problem designed to 
allow the subjects to recognize and vocalize deeper causal relationships in preparation for those 
found in this experiment. The third problem posed was, "In a market-based economy, 
expectations of inflation lead to actual inflation. Please explain how." In the event subjects were 
not familiar with the domain or were otherwise unable to form a response, cues were given to get 
them started. Figure 1 shows the relationships the subjects were expected to vocalize. 
Ericsson and Simon (1984) point out that these practice problems help subjects verbalize 
concurrently with problem solving. 
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Inflation Expectations Consumers try to buy before prices go up 




Figure 1. A Causal Model of Inflation 
3. Practice with the Interface 
Past experiments with this type of interface have indicated that the interface can be an 
impediment to understanding the decision problem (Bosley, 1994; Baker, 1992; et. al.). To 
overcome this, a simulation of a generic management problem was provided, with no explicit 
goals, and no unexpected changes in requirements to deal with. The interface for this practice 
problem is identical to that of the final simulation. During the practice simulation, subjects are 
permitted to ask questions regarding the interface and presentation of information on the screen. 
Techniques for analyzing the data and strategies for making decisions are not open for 
discussion. 
4. The Final Simulation 
All parts of the experiment were administered over a one week period to ten subjects. 
Each subject was scheduled for two two-hour time blocks, not more than two days apart. During 
the first block, they were given both the practice verbalization and the practice simulation. No 
data was collected and nothing recorded during this session. 
During the second block, the subjects were administered the final experiment. They were 
asked to vocalize throughout the entire simulation and were recorded as they did so. When 
necessary, subjects were prompted to encourage thinking aloud. As suggested by Ericsson and 
Simon (1984), these prompts were very neutral, such as, "What are you thinking now?". 
To ease the burden of transcribing the protocols, a high resolution 8mm tape was used for 
video and audio recording. Playback equipment allowed replay directly on a multimedia PC. As 
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the session was replayed, the subject's thoughts were translated verbatim to text. The text was 
then segmented into single topic thoughts or statements. These statements were then used to 
develop the coding scheme as described later in the Chapter. 
Prior to both the practice and the final simulation, the subjects were given written 
instructions which told them specifically what to do and gave them initial estimates for the 
project.   The instructions for the final simulation are included in Appendix B.   The practice 
instructions varied only in the initial estimates and the goal. 
C.       COGNITIVE MAPS AND THE NOMINAL MAP 
1. The Subjects' Cognitive Maps 
After all subjects completed the simulation, the protocols were transcribed. Once the 
transcriptions were complete, each subject's decision processes for each period were mapped 
graphically using the symbology described in Figure 2. The symbology is comparable to that 
used on the nominal map. For consistency, elements that are common to multiple maps are 
located in the same place on each map. In this way, the maps may easily be compared. The 
process used to generate the individual cognitive maps for each subject will be clarified in 
Chapter IV. 
2. Developing the Nominal Map 
The importance of having a representation of the decision task was emphasized in 
Chapter II. As discussed, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick's (1990) Systems Dynamics Model (SDM) 
for software project management was used as the basis for this simulation. As such, it also 
provided the basis for the nominal map. By pairing elements of the SDM with the symbology 
used in the subject maps, the nominal map was developed using the same symbology as the 
subject maps, but with the causal relationships of the Abdel-Hamid and Madnick model, which 
has been extensively verified. This yielded a nominal map which could then be used to compare 
and evaluate the subjects' maps. Chapter IV discusses the results of this comparison, and the 
comparison of the subjects' maps to each other. 
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Information from a source, such as a report or a graph. 
Information calculated or derived by the subject 
Subject made an assumption, applied a heuristic, or otherwise brought 
in outside decision aids. 
Addition operator. May also be multiplication, division, or 
subtraction. 
Evaluation. Indicates an evaluation or comparison. Evaluation of 
only one item indicates evaluation with past values for that item. 
Justification. Indicates the subject engaged in some sort of 
justification of a past decision. 
Explicit information flow. The subject specified the use of 
information. 
Implicit flow. The use of the information was implied, but not 
specified. 
Accurate link. The subject accurately identified a causal link between 
the linked items. 
Inaccurate link. The subject identified a link but it was inconsistent 
with the nominal map. 
Partially accurate link. The subject identified a link which captured 
part but not all of a causal relationship. 
Miracle or Blackhole. Subject either made a decision not traceable to 
any information flow or pursued an information flow which was 
never used in any decision making, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Decision group. This is the center of the map for each period. It 
contains the cost, schedule, staff, and QA decisions. The outer ring 
groups the four decisions. Flows may originate or terminate on either 
the ring or the decisions, depending on how specifically the subject 
tied the information flow to a given decision. 
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Obviously, capturing all the complex elements of the SDM was not only impractical but 
undesirable. The subjects couldn't be expected to incorporate all causal linkages in their 
cognitive maps given the information they were provided. Therefore, the nominal map is a much 
higher level look at the decision environment than provided in the SDM. It concentrates on three 
areas of the software management decision environment that are crucial to this simulation, 
namely, the Staffing decision, the Quality Assurance decision, and estimating Cost and Schedule. 
For the purposes of discussion, each of these three areas is described and illustrated as a separate 
segment in the following sections. 
a. The Staffing Decision 
Determining the staffing level is one of the key decisions a manager must make, 
yet it involves many factors. While not a complete list, the following factors are discussed in 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1990, Chap. 5). 
• The current perceived tasks left to be completed and the amount of scheduled 
time remaining must be factored into the staffing decision. 
• Hiring delays result in the size of current staff lagging behind requested staff. 
• New hires are not immediately productive. There are delays in training and 
communications overhead to consider. Knowledge of these assimilation delays 
effect the willingness of the manager to change the workforce. 
• Implicit limits on the number of new hires that can be absorbed at a time and 
on the total workforce exist and must be considered. These limits are also 
embodied in the manager's willingness to change the workforce. They reflect 
the notion that drastic changes to the staffing level will adversely effect 
productivity. 
• The stability of the workforce must be considered. Stability refers to an 
assessment of how long new hires will be needed. Stability changes depending 
on the stage of project completion. An example of consideration of stability 
would be the reluctance to add new hires late in a project, choosing instead to 
increase schedule. 
• There is constant turnover in any project that must be considered when 
assessing staffing level. 
The Staffing Decision map in Figure 3 captures these factors graphically.   The 
map basically shows that all of these factors must be evaluated when making a staffing decision. 
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Given the above discussion, the map is for the most part, self explanatory. As in the SDM, the 
notion of a managers willingness to change the workforce captures a number of the factors 
discussed. It is also worth noting that the 'Resources Required' block is a function of the 
perceived tasks left to be completed and perceived productivity. This encompasses several 
relationships that will be explored further in the Cost and Schedule Estimation map. The fact 
that the decision maps overlap in the figures illustrates the difficulty in separating the decisions 







Figure 3. The Staffing Decision 
In addition to the factors discussed, the map illustrates the relationships between the 
staffing decision and the other three decision variables. An increase in staffing level may 
increase or decrease cost and schedule depending on the other factors in the system. Conversely, 
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because a large workforce may generate a higher density of defects, due to increased 
communications overhead. The negative effect of increased staff size on productivity is also 
modeled, as is the link from experience to productivity. 
b. The Quality Assurance Decision 
The Quality Assurance (QA) subsystem is both interesting and complex. It is 
made so largely because of the simple fact that the actual number of defects in a real project can 
never be known with certainty. In the face ofthat uncertainty, managers are left with the task of 
optimizing their staff allocated to the QA effort. Chapters 8 and 18 of Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick (1990) provide a thorough discussion of the QA system and the associated economics. 
Several salient points are: 
• A number of studies have confirmed a significant savings when defects are 
discovered early. It is also evident that the error generation rate declines as a 
project progresses, partly due to an increasingly experienced workforce. 
• The optimal QA effort varies between projects, and is also dependent on the 
environment. 
• It is impossible to detect all defects, and, depending on the environment, a QA 
effort beyond a certain percentage of total development effort yields 
diminishing returns. 
• Increasing Q A effort as a percentage of total development effort results in an 
exponential increase in QA's actual cost in person-days. Since beyond a 
certain point, increases in QA person-days no longer result in corresponding 
decreases in rework and testing, the total cost of the project increases. This 
leads to a larger work force (or schedule delays). A larger work-force results 
in lessened productivity. 
Figure 4 shows a map of these QA relationships. The map graphically represents 
the points about the QA system discussed above.   It shows that in attempting to determine an 
appropriate level, the defect density during a period can be balanced against the QA person days 
per thousand delivered source instructions (kdsi). This can be accomplished in the context of the 
simulation interface by monitoring the graphs showing trends in defect density and QA 
person-days per kdsi.   For example, a declining density with no change or an increase in QA 
expenditures per kdsi may indicate a reduction in QA manning level is appropriate. Evaluating 
density and expenditure rate with past periods data, defect expectations, and with a predefined 
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QA plan which recognizes the benefits of early detection, will provide a basis for adjusting QA 
level as the project progresses. Consideration must also be given to workforce experience, since 
it effects error generation rate. All of these elements are evaluated together resulting in the QA 
allocation decision. That decision in turn effects total staff, cost, schedule, and productivity as 





kdsi % WFE 
Figure 4. The QA Decision 
c. Cost and Schedule Estimation 
Updating estimates of total programming cost and scheduled completion time are 
two additional key duties to be performed by the manager. They are presented together because 
the two estimates are so intertwined as to be practically inseparable. According to Abdel-Hamid 
and Madnick (1990, Chapters 10 and 11), the updating of cost and schedule estimates involves 
elements of both the controlling and planning subsystems. The controlling subsystem involves 
measuring  progress  and  expended  resources  on the  project.     The  planning   subsystem 
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encompasses the initial project estimates and their updates through the projects life.    The 
following factors are noteworthy: 
• Any control system consists of at least three elements: Measurement, or 
detection of what is happening; Evaluation which usually involves a 
comparison of what is happening to some expectations; and Communication or 
report of what is happening so it can be used. 
• It is difficult to measure progress in software development. Usually in early 
stages of a project, reported progress is based on resources expended. As the 
project progresses, accomplishments become more visible and reported 
progress and productivity become more a function of perceived tasks 
completed. 
• When adjustments to cost are perceived necessary, managers first try to absorb 
them via staff and productivity. Only when this fails are they willing to adjust 
the projected cost of the project. 
• The schedule determination can be made by simply dividing the cost in person 
days by the number of persons on the project to obtain the number of days 
required for project completion. 
• Schedule pressure can have a significant effect on productivity. When a 
project is perceived to be behind schedule, developers are capable of bursts of 
productivity for short periods of time. (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1990, 
Chapter 7) 
The map in Figure 5 illustrates one way which the cost and schedule estimates 
might be achieved. It shows the decision process starting by calculating requirements remaining 
and dividing by perceived productivity to get a new estimate of resources required to complete 
the project. Resources expended must be added in to obtain the new cost estimate. This in turn 
can be divided by staff to obtain the days required for the total project.   In this view of the 
decision problem, it is assumed that the staffing decision is made first. Staff will be adjusted if 
appropriate considering the willingness to change workforce and other factors modeled in the 
Staffing Decision. The notion that schedule pressure affects productivity is also modeled. This 
effect is observable in the simulation, but only after the fact. In other words, subjects may see a 
seemingly inexplicable productivity burst resulting in a large jump in reported progress as they 
approach their estimated duration. 
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Figure 5. Cost and Schedule Estimation 
At some point in the estimation process, a decision maker should acknowledge the 
inherent unreliability of the reported progress on which the decisions are based, and expectations 
of future changes in requirements and productivity. This notion is specifically modeled for 
productivity, requirements, and requirements completed. It also applies to percent reported 
complete, which is simply another way of viewing reported progress. If a manager has any 
expectations of future changes in requirements or productivity, or if they perceive any errors in 
reporting, they adjust the figures accordingly. Also, in the case of our experiment, the subjects 
were given a specific goal of minimizing overruns in both schedule and cost, so they could 













modeled in the map. Again, the non-linear links between the four decision variables are 
represented. These have already been discussed in the previous two sections. 
d. The Complete Nominal Map 
After having analyzed each of the three areas, they can easily be combined to 
form the nominal map of the decision making environment for this experiment. The complete 
map is shown in Figure 6. 
Nominal Map 
Figure 6. The Nominal Map 
D.       THE CODING SCHEME 
While the mapping scheme provides the basis for discussion of the subjects cognitive 
maps, a more rigorous coding scheme is needed to analyze the protocols thoroughly. Such a 
scheme was developed, but time constraints did not allow its' use. A complete description of the 
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E.       CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, the experimental design and the methods used to capture the protocols 
were discussed. The methods developed to structure the resulting data were also discussed. This 
included the development of a mapping scheme and a detailed coding scheme. 
Chapter IV will present the results of mapping each subjects decision process and 




A.        CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the results of the analysis discussed in Chapter III will be presented. First, 
the interesting aspects of the survey results will be discussed. Next, the decisions for all subjects 
during each period are plotted and analyzed. The performance of each subject's simulation will 
then be explored by looking at the outcomes of their decisions. Finally, the maps for each 
subject's decision processes will be discussed by period. By analyzing the survey responses, the 
decisions, the performance, and the maps of each subject, a complete picture of that subject's 
mental model of the decision problem will be evident. 
It is important to note that while ten subjects participated, only the processes of seven are 
analyzed. As previously discussed, two subjects were dropped because they had no program 
management experience. A third subject was dropped when it became apparent that he had never 
recognized that the project was growing. Consequently, his decision processes were not 
comparable to the others. The subjects not used were numbered 2, 4, and 5. 
B.        SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey and a summary of the results are presented in Appendix A. Several 
interesting points are worth noting: 
• Of the two goals of minimizing overruns in both cost and schedule, 6 of the 
subjects felt they placed a greater emphasis on schedule than cost. The one 
remaining subject, subject 3, felt he gave the two goals equal consideration. 
• Five of the subjects felt the reports were more useful than the graphs in making 
decisions. The remaining two, subjects 3 and 9, rated them equally useful. 
• Software project management experience of the group ranged from 5 years to 
23 years. Subjects 1, 3, and 8 all had over 17 years while the rest were under 
twelve. The three subjects over 17 were observed to have a more difficult time 
verbalizing during their decision processes. This was especially true of 
subjects 1 and 3. 
29 
.  
.  I  
 t i  t , t  lt  f t  l i    t r  ill  t . i t, 
      ll t l  
  t   .     '  i  
          ,   
'  
    '









C.       DECISIONS 
The simulation required each subject to decide on an initial total staff and a percentage of 
total staff to allocate to QA. During each subsequent 40 day increment, the subjects were also 
required to estimate cost and schedule. Each of the decisions for each subject by period were 
extracted during the simulation and are plotted in Figures 7-10. Each of the decision graphs 
will be discussed in turn. Each subjects decisions will be discussed in greater detail in Section E 
of this chapter. 
1. Staffing 
The general shape of the staffing curves (Figure 7) followed the growth profile of the 
project. In other words, the subjects tended to add people as they perceived the project was 
growing. For instance, subject 8 recognized the requirements growth immediately, and began 
adding in the third period. Most of the subjects tended to be reluctant to add people late in the 
project. In fact, no one requested additional people within 3 periods of the projects completion. 
Several subjects deserve special attention. Subject 7 assumed a 50% growth in the 
project and also elected to commit a high percentage of staff to QA. This explains his high initial 
staffing decision. Subject 9 also exhibited interesting behavior when he reduced staff early in the 
project. This was done prior to recognition of the requirements growth, and was intended to 
improve project performance by getting rid of the inexperienced workforce. The subject quickly 
hired additional people when he recognized the requirements growth. Subject 8 seemed to 
overreact to the requirements growth, and subsequently reduced staff at the end of the project. 
2. Quality Assurance 
The quality assurance decisions are plotted in Figure 8. The behavior here was not as 
consistent as the staffing decision. Ideally, errors are detected early on in the project, reducing 
the cost of rework. In practice however, only three subjects behaved according to this notion. 
Subject 7 expressly chose a QA profile which started high and tapered off towards the end of the 
project. Unfortunately, while the shape of this profile was consistent with the idea of early 
detection, the percentages throughout were much higher than they needed to be. Subject 8 also 
voiced a desire to detect defects early, but was overcome with the requirements growth towards 
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Figure 7. The Staffing Decision 
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the end of the project. Subject 9 also expressed a desire to detect defects early. During the 
simulation, he adjusted the QA level in an effort to keep the defect density at a target level. 
Towards the end of the project he recognized that defect density would fall off regardless of 
effort, since there simply were not as many defects to detect. While sub-optimal, this proved to 
be one of the more effective strategies. 
Subjects 3, 6, and 10, seemed to have no firm strategy for QA. They either accepted the 
default of 10% or reduced the level even further to improve productivity. Subject 1 clearly stated 
he believed QA early in the project was a waste of time. He demonstrated this by increasing QA 
level over the course of the project. 
3. Cost 
Figure 9 shows the subjects cost estimates plotted over time. As one might expect, the 
subject's estimated cost increased as the project grew. The exceptions to this were subjects 10 
and 3. These two subjects never increased their cost estimates even when resources expended 
exceeded the estimate. This indicates a possible failure to grasp this facet of the project. Subject 
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Figure 9. The Cost Estimate 
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4. Schedule 
Figure 10 shows the schedule estimates of the subjects over time. Like the cost estimates, 
these curves generally followed the growth profile of the project. Subject 3 again made no 
changes, although he actually did complete the project within the allotted time. Subject 9 made 
an errant calculation which drove his estimate high for two periods. Interestingly, the subjects 
seemed much less willing to increase their schedule estimates than the cost estimates. Many of 
the cost estimates doubled over the course of the project, while the schedule estimates grew by 
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Figure 10. The Schedule Estimate 
D. PERFORMANCE 
While the thrust of this investigation was to explore the decision processes of managers, a 
brief look at their performance is also useful. The performance of each subject can be measured 
in terms of defects in the project, total cost and total duration. These data points are extracted 
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1. Defects 
Looking at the total defects in each subject's project can provide some interesting insight 
into the impact of their decisions. As shown in Figure 8, Subject 3 paid little attention to defects 
over the course of the project, allocating only 5% of staff to QA. Figure 11 shows this resulted 
in over 6000 defects - three times the next highest subject. Subject 10 allocated only 10% and 
cut defects to roughly 2000. On the other end of the spectrum, subject 7 allocated as much as 
50% of staff to QA, but defects were only marginally less than subjects 8 and 9 who never 




2. Final Cost 
Comparing the project cost to QA and total defects provides further insight into the 
consequences of the staffing and QA decisions. Figure 12 shows that subject 7 clearly paid a 
premium for a marginal improvement in quality. Comparing subjects 3 and 10, we see that 
subject 3 saved only a few person-days by ignoring QA, while subject 10 improved quality by a 
factor of three for almost no additional man-days. While QA is not the only factor contributing 
to project cost, Figures 11 and 12 demonstrate graphically how failing to optimize QA may result 
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Figure 13 shows the final duration of each project. The outcomes in terms of duration do 
not vary as dramatically as the final costs. This is consistent with the priorities subjects placed 
on meeting their scheduling goals. While cost and schedule can be traded off to some degree, 
most subjects placed a greater emphasis on meeting their schedule goal. 
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E.        INDIVIDUAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
1. Mapping the decision processes 
As discussed, the verbal protocols for each subject were analyzed after being transcribed. 
The mapping scheme developed in Chapter III was used to develop a map of each subjects 
decision process for each period. The maps are contained in Appendix D. The symbology used 
is the same that was used in the nominal map. Figure 2 in Chapter III provides a legend ofthat 
symbology. 
To provide amplification to the graphic view, a narrative for each of the subjects is 
included here. The narratives are broken out by period, and elaborate on interesting aspects of 
the subjects' maps, especially heuristics used and links developed. These narratives are intended 
to be used to compliment the maps in Appendix D. 
a. Subject 1 Narrative 
Initial decision. The subject computed the underlying productivity assumption 
for the initial estimates, but did not explicitly use this information in any decisions. He then 
divided cost by schedule to determine initial staff size and rounded up to the next whole number. 
The initial QA level was based on the suggested 10% and a heuristic voiced by the subject which 
demonstrated the belief that QA should be done primarily towards the end of the programming 
phase. Based on that heuristic, the subject used a predefined profile for QA level. 
40 days. Only staff, work force experienced, and defect data were viewed by the 
subject. The defect density compared favorably to the subject's expectations. The subject did 
not notice the increase in requirements. 
80 days. During this period, the subject began to compare reported progress to 
elapsed time. The apparent discrepancy was then correctly linked to the observed level of 
experience. This link captures the concept that a less experienced workforce will be less 
productive. This notion is illustrated in the nominal model as the link between workforce 
experience and productivity. The increasing requirements were recognized during this period, 
and implicitly tied to staff and schedule. The subject felt that in response to the increasing 
requirements, he may have to increase staff or schedule.   This simple link between staff and 
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schedule did not demonstrate a grasp of the complexities of the web existing between the four 
decision variables (Figure 7). 
120 days. Here, resources required to complete the project were computed, then 
added to resources expended to obtain a new estimate for total cost. This was then divided by 
the old cost estimate to obtain a factor increase of 1.3. The factor increase was then applied to 
the schedule estimate as well. This demonstrated an incorrect linear link between cost and 
schedule. Having accounted for increasing requirements by updating the cost and schedule 
estimates, the subject then inexplicably added an additional person to the staff, apparently just for 
good measure. This is demonstrated by the flow originating on the decision group ring and 
terminating on the staff decision. 
160 days.   Having increased the staff by one last period, the subject felt his 
decision was justified this period by another increase in requirements.    The subject then 
compared the requirements growth with their expectations for normal growth.   Through this 
comparison the subject determined that the initial planning was inadequate and that in the 
"real-world" they would call some meetings to try and get the project under control. 
200 days. In this period, the subject seemed to become slightly overwhelmed by 
the complexity of the problem. This is evidenced by the dead end flows and the dysfunctional 
update to cost. First, the subject computed a factor increase in requirements from the beginning 
of the project, apparently to apply to cost and schedule, but then never used the information. He 
then computed the resources required to complete the project, but rather than add this to 
resources expended as at 120 days, he compared it to resources remaining for no apparent reason. 
The subject then correctly used the resources required to compute additional time required, but 
erroneously added the 32 days to both cost and schedule, clearly a mistake. Comments voiced by 
the subject did illustrate a reluctance to add people late in the project. The subject also 
demonstrated a simple link between staff and the other decision variables, although a complete 
grasp of the interrelationships was still not evident. 
240 days. The subject noted a slowing of the requirements increase and an 
improvement in the teams productivity. Based on the reported progress, the subject applied his 
predefined QA plan and increased the staff allocated to QA. 
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280 days. There were no changes during this period. The subject merely 
reviewed some of the information available, and commented that the graphs were not very 
useful. 
320 days. Again in this period, the subject reviewed a few data points and applied 
his predefined profile for QA staffing and increased QA effort. 
Summary. This subject demonstrated a rudimentary grasp of some of the 
relationships. He seemed to understand the staffing decision reasonably well, however the 
relationships between cost and schedule eluded him. While he had a QA plan, it did not account 
for the potential savings from early detection of errors, nor did he assess his QA performance 
based on cost per error. 
b. Subject 3 Narrative 
Initial decision. The subject calculated the productivity assumption underlying 
the initial figures. He also divided requirements by schedule, but never voiced the result. He 
then calculated an initial staff and adjusted it up based on an expected .65 'efficiency'. His notion 
of efficiency is captured in the model in productivity expectations (Figure 6). The subject 
commented that he felt QA at the beginning of the programming phase was a waste of time. He 
then elected to allocate 5% of staff to QA. 
40 days. The subject did a poor job of verbalizing, but essentially just reviewed 
the reports and graphs. He recognized the requirements increase immediately, and appeared to 
assess progress versus elapsed time, but made no changes. 
80 days. During this period the subject was more thorough in his review of 
information. Although he noted the requirements increase, he generally felt that there were 
insufficient changes in the project to alter any of his decisions. He stated that the requirements 
increase might justify 'another quarter person or so', but that he would let it go for another period. 
He also expressed doubt about the accuracy of reported data, specifically percent reported 
complete, consistent with the nominal map (Figure 6). 
120 days. The subject quickly scanned the reports but keyed on the requirements 
growth and the reported progress versus elapsed time. He accurately identified a tradeoff 
between extending the project or hiring more people (Figure 4).  He also inaccurately extended 
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this notion to include a direct tradeoff between cost and staff. He seemed to feel that by 
increasing staff, he avoided cost overruns, even in the face of increasing requirements. In the 
end, he chose to increase staff to 6 and make no other changes. 
160 days. Since this subject did not vocalize very well, it was difficult to trace the 
entire decision process. Some interesting points were observable however. The subject was 
extremely frustrated with the increasing requirements, and remarked that in a normal project, that 
level of requirements growth would be grounds for halting the project. Despite the requirements 
growth, he was much more willing to increase staff than update the schedule or cost estimates, 
despite the pressure of the approaching deadline. As a result, he held cost and schedule constant, 
but increased staff to 7. This was apparently in consideration of his goals, which he reiterated 
during the period. He also commented that QA was 'not my problem', referring again to the 
goals of minimizing overruns in cost and schedule. This was apparently further justification for 
his relatively low allocation to QA, but it ignores the fact that insufficient QA effort can result in 
excessive rework, which can in turn lead to cost and schedule overruns. 
200 days. The subject made many of the same assertions as in the previous 
period, and again opted to increase manning based on the increasing requirements. In this 
instance, there was no evidence of an assessment of progress, merely a response of increasing 
staff by one based on increasing requirements. He did note that experience had dropped down, 
but failed to recognize this was linked to his increases in staff. He also did a comparison of 
defect density and QA expenditures per kdsi, but incorrectly concluded that since the defect 
density was rising and expenditure rate was falling, his QA effort was acceptable. In reality, the 
fact that he was detecting more defects with lower expenditures per kdsi was a good indication 
that there were an increasing number of defects in the code. 
Summary. While this subjects thoughts were not as clearly voiced as some others, 
several points were evident. First the subject placed a heavy emphasis on meeting his goals. As 
a result, he held constant the cost and schedule estimates while steadily increasing staff in the 
face of increasing requirements. In doing so, he failed to recognize the cost associated with 
bringing in staff late in the programming phase. Second, he failed to note the cost of rework 
associated with an insufficient percentage of staff allocated to QA. He further misinterpreted the 
defect density and QA expenditures to support his QA allocation decision, when it really 
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indicated a higher QA level might be appropriate. Finally, the interrelationships between the 
decision variables were never clearly established. He was very frustrated by the increasing 
requirements which undoubtedly compounded his difficulty in seeing the relationships in all of 
these areas. 
c. Subject 6 Narrative 
Initial decision. Like several of the subjects, this subject calculated the 
underlying productivity assumptions of the initial estimates, but then never explicitly used that 
information. He based his initial staffing decision solely on the estimated cost divided by 
schedule. The QA allocation was made strictly on the basis of the suggested value. 
40 days. During this period, the subject merely browsed the reports and graphs, 
then opted to leave the decisions unchanged. 
80 days. The subject recognized the increasing requirements immediately in this 
period. He responded by computing a percent increase in requirements, then applying that as a 
linear factor to both staff and cost. This approach seems logical but neglects the actual 
productivity of the programmers. It makes no allowance for the progress made on the original 
requirements. The subject compared the trends in defects detected and QA expenditures, and 
opted to leave QA manning the same. Schedule also remained unchanged. 
120 days. Much like the previous period, the subject applied a linear factor to the 
staff requested and the cost estimate, based on the increased requirements. He did note a decline 
in productivity that he accurately attributed to his growing staff (Figure 4). He made no change 
to QA or schedule, but did comment that he was 'running out of time'. 
160 days. During this period the subject eventually demonstrated a fairly 
thorough grasp of the cost and schedule estimation aspects of the decision problem. He 
identified the increase in requirements, and compared his progress to elapsed time. Initially, he 
reacted to the new increase in requirements by trying to increase staff, cost and schedule by the 
same factor as requirements. He eventually used productivity and remaining requirements to 
estimate resources required, then rounded this up. By dividing this by a new staff of six, he came 
up with a new estimate for duration. His decision to increase the staff by one more person was 
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based on the amount he had allocated to QA, expected turnover, and to some degree on the 
increase in requirements. 
200 days. The subject again noted progress lagging behind elapsed time, even 
with the new schedule estimate. He re-estimated cost and found it to be close to his previous 
estimate, primarily because he had rounded cost up the previous period. Based on that and a 
review of the other data, he opted to leave all estimates unchanged for another period. It is 
noteworthy that he considered increasing staff, but was reluctant to do so. The exact cause for 
the unwillingness to change wasn't clear. 
240 days. In this period, the subject recognized that requirements had increased 
again, then re-estimated cost based on the new requirements. Finding his previous estimate still 
sufficient, he calculated that it would take an additional 1.5 people to finish the project in the 
time remaining, but was unwilling to request the additional staff because of the hiring and 
assimilation delay and the limited time remaining. Based on his current staff, he then calculated 
an additional 29 days would be required to complete the project. Had he stopped there, his 
process would have been fairly accurate, unfortunately he then multiplied his new estimate for 
days by the current staff to get a new cost estimate. Since the current staff was much higher than 
average staff during the course of the project, this resulted in an erroneously high cost estimate, 
clearly a mistake. This indicated only a partial understanding of the relationships between cost 
and staff. He also compared defect density to QA expenditures, and found density rising with 
falling expenditures. Like subject 3, he misinterpreted this to justify his current allocation QA, 
when in reality, it probably indicated that a growing number of defects were evident in the code, 
and were therefore easier to detect. 
280 days. The subject computed the resources required and used them to check 
his schedule estimate, but never checked his estimate for cost. He also compared progress to 
elapsed time to evaluate his schedule estimate. He then noted a decline in the defect density, and 
accurately attributed it to the improving experience level of the workforce (Figure 5). He also 
compared the trends in cost growth with the requirements growth, which should have been an 
indicator of the error in his cost estimate. He was satisfied with the status and made no changes 
to any of the decision variables, having failed to catch his excessive cost estimate. 
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320 days. Based on the days remaining and the resources required to complete 
the project, the subject recognized that he could reduce staff, but was unwilling to do so. He 
again failed to recognize his previous error in the cost estimate, even after seeing costs climbing 
relative to requirements. He attributed the fact that requirements had grown by 50% while costs 
had doubled solely to assimilation delay. In reality, his cost estimate was merely in error. 
Summary. This subject demonstrated a fairly robust understanding of the problem 
space. He correctly linked staff, cost and schedule, with the exception of his cost estimation 
error. He accurately expressed the impact of hiring and assimilation delays, and how they effect 
the staffing decision late in the project. Like many of the subjects, a complete grasp of the QA 
problem eluded him. Also like many subjects, misinterpretations tended to justify the subjects 
past decisions. This is evident both in his evaluation of defect density versus QA expenditures, 
and his evaluation of cost versus requirements growth. 
d. Subject 7 Narrative 
Initial decision. This subject had a very well defined approach to the problem. 
His staffing decision consisted of first making the initial estimate two different ways, then 
applying a correction factor of three to each estimate, and then intuitively choosing between the 
two. The first estimate was made by simply dividing cost by schedule. The second estimate 
involved dividing requirements by duration, then dividing by an assumed productivity of 8 lines 
of code per person day to get staff. The adjustment factor of three consisted of 1.5 for potential 
increases in requirements, and 2.0 as a general rule of thumb. Both estimates came out close 
(10.5 and 10.9) and he rounded up to 11 for an initial staffing decision. His initial QA level was 
determined by a predefined profile in which he planned to start out high on the first period, go 
higher still in the second, then slowly taper off the QA effort in the latter stages of the project. 
While this plan accurately allowed for the economies of uncovering errors early, it did not 
recognize the increased costs of placing too great an emphasis on QA. 
40 days. The subject evaluated the percentage complete versus the percentage of 
time used, the actual productivity versus his expectations, and looked at staff and experience 
level. By looking at current staff versus expected staff, the subject estimated an average staff 
over the project, then removed the previous allowance for 50% project growth, then multiplied 
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by total duration to develop an estimate of project cost based on initial requirements. After 
looking at the defect density, he increased his QA effort to 50 % based on his predefined profile. 
These events indicated at least a partial understanding of the linkages between staff and cost, but 
still failed to demonstrate the linkage between QA and cost and the notion of diminishing returns 
on QA effort. The subject did state the density was 'pretty high' indicating a comparison with 
some defect expectations. 
80 days. The subject looked at much the same data as during the last period. He 
adjusted QA down to 45% based on the predefined profile, and linked QA level to productivity. 
Since he still didn't recognize the negative effect of over manning QA, this link to productivity 
was deemed partially accurate. He again commented that defects were 'awful high'. The subject 
also accurately linked experience to defect density and to productivity. That is, as experience 
goes up, defects should decline, and productivity should rise. Based on the expected 
improvements in productivity, the subject felt the disparity between elapsed time and task 
completion was cause for concern but not alarm. The subject did comment at this point that he 
did not find the graphs of the information useful and did not intend to use them. Had the subject 
viewed the graphs, he may have identified the increasing requirements sooner, and factored that 
into his evaluation. 
120 days. The subject voiced a growing concern over the continuing slide in 
productivity. He failed to conclude that this was due to the excessive QA level and 
correspondingly high staff. The subject continued to follow his predefined profile regarding QA 
level, lowering QA to 40%. Other decisions remained the same. 
160 days. The subject noted that productivity was beginning to improve, but the 
progress did not compare favorably with elapsed time. He looked closely at experience, staff, 
and defects. He felt that the defect density was still high enough to justify his slow reduction of 
QA, rather than a faster reduction. Based on this, he opted to reduce the QA level another 5%. 
At this point, he recognized an increase in requirements, but also noted that his initial staffing 
estimate had allowed for it. He calculated the resources required to complete the project and, 
based on the days remaining, estimated that it would take a staff of 16 to complete the project. 
The subject felt this was not within acceptable limits for total staff, so chose to extend the project 
instead, demonstrating an unwillingness to change the workforce. Using the calculated resources 
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required to complete the project, he divided by the staff to determine additional days required to 
complete, which he then applied to the schedule estimate. He also updated cost, but inexplicably 
used his new estimate for total duration times the current staff to get the total cost of the project. 
Had he merely added the resources required to those expended, he would have had a more 
accurate cost estimate. Aside from this apparent lapse, the subject demonstrated a fairly 
complete understanding of the cost/schedule/staff relationship (Figures 4 and 6). He had still not 
recognized the impact of the QA level on the other variables. 
200 days. The subject again compared reported progress to elapsed time. He then 
corrected his previous error in estimating cost by taking days remaining times staff and adding it 
to resources expended to obtain the total cost. He then recognized the new requirements and 
repeated the process, re-estimating both cost and schedule. He again commented that his initial 
expectations had allowed for a 50% growth. Interestingly, the subject also considered future 
improvements in productivity, but opted for the more conservative reported figures. The 
decision process for this period demonstrated a fairly thorough understanding of the cost and 
schedule estimation problem.   After looking at defects, the subject continued his predefined 
profile for QA. 
240 days. The subject first noted the addition of more requirements, but stressed 
that it was still within his initial allowance for growth. He was pleased that progress was now 
even with elapsed time and productivity was on the rise. He noted an improved experience level 
and declining defects. The subject felt that he was poised for very good performance in the 
upcoming period. The only change made was to continue to decrease the QA effort, lowering it 
to 25%. 
280 days. Recognizing a small additional increase, the subject re-estimated cost 
and schedule, similar to approaches in previous periods. He noted that he had a choice between 
shortening the schedule or reducing staff based on improving performance. After considering his 
initial goals of minimizing overruns in both cost and schedule, he expressed a reluctance to 
reduce staff, and chose to reduce duration. 
Summary. This subject demonstrated a thorough grasp of the entire problem 
space with only one notable exception. He failed to account for the diminishing returns in QA 
staffing level. By allocating an extraordinarily high percentage of staff to QA, he forced his total 
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staff up, resulting in excess communications overhead, and subsequently decreasing productivity. 
The productivity was also directly and negatively affected simply from having a smaller 
percentage of the staff generating code. The net result was a much costlier project completed 
behind schedule. 
e. Subject 8 Narrative 
Initial decision. The subject computed the productivity assumption underlying 
the initial requirements and cost estimates. He also computed an initial staff based on the initial 
cost and schedule estimates. His experience led him to believe that actual productivity would be 
lower, and he expected some delays in 'bringing people on board'. These assumptions or 
heuristics were the basis for raising the initial staff from 3.5 to six. Based on his experience, he 
set the initial QA allocation to 20%. 
40 days. The subject immediately noted the change in requirements, although he 
felt that it wasn't significant at this point. He compared the percent of the project completed with 
the percentage of person days used. He noted that productivity and defect density compared 
favorably to what he would expect. No changes were made to any of the decisions. 
80 days. The subject again recognized the increase in requirements and calculated 
the additional cost required. For some reason, he mistakenly used the initial productivity of 17 
dsi per person day instead of the reported productivity to make the new cost estimate. He also 
only calculated the additional incremental cost associated with the new requirements. This in 
effect assumes that performance to date has gone as expected and will continue to do so through 
the initial requirements. As a result of these two errors, he only raised estimated person days 
required to 1000. He decided to add an additional person to deal with the increasing 
requirements, but hold schedule constant, based on the increasing requirements. While the 
staffing decision wasn't based on a specific calculation, and despite his other oversights, he did 
display a partial understanding of the cost, schedule and staff relationship (Figures 4 and 6). He 
elected to leave the QA allocation level unchanged. 
120 days. The subject recognized an increase in requirements, and a lag in 
progress compared to expenditures. This period, the subject used his expectations of 
productivity to  calculate  additional  resources  required.     He  reasoned  that the  reported 
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productivity was reasonable based on workforce experience and could be expected to come up as 
experience level rose. He then used his current staff to calculate additional days to complete the 
project. While he used a more appropriate figure for productivity, he again did an incremental 
cost estimate, ignoring performance on the initial requirements. Finally, the subject reluctantly 
elected to add one more person to the staff based on expectations that requirements growth 
would continue. The subject seemed to understand the cost/schedule and staff/schedule 
relationships, but it wasn't clear that he understood the additional costs incurred from staffing 
changes. QA remained unchanged. 
160 days. This period, the subject's decision process was almost identical to the 
last. Based on incremental requirements, cost and schedule were updated. Then the subject 
increased the staff level by two, basically stating the requirements increase outweighed concerns 
over adding people this late in the project. This decision seemed to indicate that he did not fully 
appreciate the staff/cost relationship. He did note declining defect density and elected to 
decrease his QA level to 15%, consistent with a QA plan which recognized the benefits of early 
detection. 
200 days. Expressing expectations that requirements would start to level off and 
productivity would improve, the subject re-estimated cost, this time based on all requirements 
remaining, rather than just the incremental increase in requirements. He found no increase in 
schedule necessary, and made no changes to either staff or QA. He did state that in retrospect, he 
would have tried to build staff up sooner to anticipate the requirements changes, rather than bring 
them in over the course of the project. These comments indicated a better understanding of the 
cost/schedule relationship (Figure 6) than was evident from his previous decisions. 
240 days. During this period, the subject left cost the same, but re-estimated 
duration and opted to decrease the schedule. He considered reducing staff, but didn't 'trust the 
changes in requirements'. His comments regarding staff indicated at least a partial understanding 
of the cost/staff relationship (Figure 4). The subject accurately attributed a decline in both the 
defect density and the QA expenditures to workforce experience. He elected to leave QA 
unchanged at this point. 
280 days. The subject was very surprised at the progress made during this period. 
He noted that at 280 days, he wasn't that far over on schedule, but was way over on cost. This 
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was not in agreement with his initial goal of minimizing overruns in both cost and schedule. 
Based on that observation and the remaining requirements (1000 dsi), he reduced staff by four 
and reduced the schedule to 300. He felt that this would only make a marginal difference in cost, 
so cost remained unchanged. This analysis was evidence of a fairly complete understanding of 
the cost/schedule/staff relationship. QA also remained unchanged. 
Summary. Over the course of the experiment, this subject demonstrated a 
thorough grasp of the cost/schedule/staff relationship. His analysis of the QA problem was 
promising, but he never fully recognized the opportunity to reduce QA allocation and save costs 
as the defect density declined towards the end of the project. Initially, he had alluded to a profile 
which called for early detection and reduced QA effort towards the end. It seemed in practice 
however, the QA problem took a back seat to the cost/schedule/staff decision instead of being 
part of it. 
/ Subject 9 Narrative 
Initial decision. After reviewing the initial estimates, the subject made an initial 
staffing decision of 5, but was not clear what he based that decision on. He specifically reiterated 
his goals of minimizing overruns in cost and schedule, but again it wasn't clear how this factored 
into his decision. He did have a specific QA plan which included the notion of early detection. 
His initial QA allocation was 20% of total staff. 
40 days. The subject compared reported progress to elapsed time, and noted that 
he was already behind. He accurately assessed that causes could include hiring delays and an 
inexperienced workforce. He failed to notice the increasing requirements. He found that defect 
density exceeded the suggested range of 5 - 20 defects per kdsi. He accurately noted that this 
could be due to an inexperienced workforce, but he felt he was probably spending too much on 
QA, detracting from the coding effort and increasing cost. 
80 days. The subject noted improvements in current staff and experience. He felt 
that he got a 'good response' to his change in QA allocation, noting density dropped to near the 
suggested range. He then noted his reported progress was still lagging elapsed time. In an effort 
to improve this he decided to further reduce his QA effort to 10%, but felt that he wouldn't be 
able to go much below that.  In making this decision, the subject seemed to overlook the effect 
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that undiscovered defects would have on productivity and cost in terms of rework. Not having 
recognized the requirements increase, the subject elected to decrease staff by one, in an effort to 
improve productivity, with a smaller more experienced workforce. While the subject's decision 
demonstrated an accurate linkage between assimilation delays and productivity (Figure 4), he 
apparently misunderstood the long-term relationship between staff and cost. 
120 days. The subject evaluated staff and workforce experience, and was pleased 
in the improved experience level. He observed a significant decline in defect density, which he 
accurately attributed both to the improved experience level and the decreased allocation to QA 
effort (Figure 5). He opted to increase effort back to the previous 15% level to avoid 'buggy 
code'. While this was probably an astute decision, he could have better ascertained the cause of 
the declining density by also examining the QA expenditure rate. If expenditures were declining 
as rapidly as density, it may have indicated that the 10% allocation was still acceptable. 
160 days. During this period, the subject first recognized the growing 
requirements. Based on this, he immediately decided to increase the workforce from four to six. 
Based on defect density and expectations, he felt the QA allocation was acceptable, but cost and 
schedule definitely would increase. The new increased cost estimate was not mathematically 
supported, just an intuitive increase of 500 person-days based on requirements growth to date 
and expectations that requirements growth would continue. The new schedule estimate was 
obtained by dividing the days expended by the percent of code completed. This would have 
given the total duration required, but the subject mistakenly added it back to days expended to 
obtain an excessive estimate of 540 days. Fully accurate linkages between staff, cost and 
schedule were not evident at this point, however, the subject was beginning to demonstrate a 
partial understanding of the relationships. 
200 days. The subject was satisfied with staff, experience, and defects. He also 
commented that his last schedule estimate was probably in error. Noting the additional 
requirements increase, his first inclination was not to increase staff because he felt the training 
time and additional overhead were too significant this late in the project. Reconsidering progress 
based on expectations that requirements would continue to grow at the same rate, he decided that 
he was in fact only a third of the way through the project. Given that deduction, he was more 
willing to change the workforce, and chose to increase staff from six to eight.   He seemed to 
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become so engrossed in the staffing decision that he forgot the other two. Despite 
acknowledging the schedule estimate was probably in error, and expecting requirements to 
continue to grow, he changed neither schedule nor cost. QA also remained unchanged. 
240 days. Again the subject was satisfied with the current staff, experience and 
defects. He re-estimated cost by dividing the person-days expended by the percent complete to 
get a new total cost. He also corrected his previous error in schedule estimation by computing 
resources required to complete the project and dividing by current staff. Ironically, the 
computation of resources required could have been used to more accurately update cost as well. 
The subject felt that changing staff again at this point would be counterproductive. He was also 
content to leave the QA allocation at 15%. His apparent understanding of the relationships 
between cost and schedule was more complete in this period. He also commented that any 
staffing increase at this point would probably increase the overall cost and duration of the 
project, demonstrating the staff/schedule relationship. 
280 days. Staff and experience were favorably evaluated by the subject. He 
noted a decline in defects to something outside of his expected range, and used this as a basis for 
increasing QA allocation back to 20%. What he failed to recognize, was that the decline in 
density was most likely due to fewer defects, rather than a shortage of people assigned to QA. A 
comparison to QA expenditures would have helped make this apparent. The subject noted 
requirements growth had nearly ceased, and the percent reported complete increased acceptably. 
He re-estimated cost and schedule, and found neither needed to be updated. 
320 days. This period, the subjects process was almost identical to the last. He 
did recognize that defect density continued to decline despite his additional allocation. He 
accurately deduced that his more experienced workforce was producing fewer defects, and he 
elected to reduce allocation back to 15%. With further analysis, he may have been able to lower 
it even further. Having recalculated his schedule estimate and finding it unchanged, the subject 
did not re-estimate cost. 
Summary. While the subject started out with a QA plan, he managed the QA 
allocation level based on the defect density and expectations. By adjusting QA allocation and 
observing the effects, he was fairly effective in determining a workable level. Had he examined 
the trends in QA person-days per kdsi, he could have more effectively made decisions, and used 
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less of a trial and error approach. Despite an errant reduction in workforce early in the project 
and an excessive schedule estimate, the subject eventually demonstrated a fairly thorough grasp 
of the relationships between cost, schedule, and staff. 
g. Subject 10 Narrative 
Initial decision. The subject computed the underlying productivity assumption 
for the initial estimates and also asserted his expectations for individual productivity. The 
subject computed the staff size based on the initial cost and schedule estimates and also based on 
the initial requirements and schedule estimates, then used his own expectations for productivity. 
The subject opted for the more conservative estimates resulting from his productivity 
expectations. This was similar to the approach used by subject 7. The subject simply used the 
suggested QA level of 10% as his QA plan. 
40 days. The requirements increase was recognized immediately, but the subject 
also recognized a productivity higher than his initial estimate. After considering the other factors 
mapped, he opted to absorb the requirements increase with the better than expected productivity, 
leaving staffing, cost, and schedule the same. This is consistent with the nominal map (Figure 
6). Defects met the subjects expectations when compared to QA expenditures. Note the subject 
evaluated density against QA expenditures per kdsi, but did not use a predefined plan 
incorporating the notion that it is cheaper to detect and correct errors earlier. 
80 days. Subject noted changes in requirements, productivity, experience, staff, 
and defect density. He also compared the percentage of the project completed to the percentage 
of resources expended. He then seemed to use this as a basis for increasing the duration by 25 
days, however the complete source of this decision isn't clear. It seemed as though he simply 
sensed he was behind and applied an arbitrary 25 day extension to the schedule. Other decisions 
were unchanged. 
120 days. Very similar to the previous period, except the comparison of resources 
expended and requirements completed appeared to be used as the basis for increasing the 
estimated project cost by 11 person-days. He noted that it was a choice between increasing cost 
or  increasing  staff,  indicating  a  linkage  between the  two.     At this  point,  the  subjects 
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understanding of any other relationships between cost, schedule, and staff• was not readily 
apparent. 
160 days. This time the subject only noted the increase in requirements and the 
lag of tasks completed behind resources expended. He then increased staff by one. 
200 days. During this period, the subject observed an increase in productivity, but 
did not trace it to perceived schedule pressure. He also noted increases in requirements and 
experience level, and assessed the defect density. He then reduced his QA effort to 5% of total 
staff. Although the complete basis for this decision was not clear, it seemed to be based on a 
perceived schedule pressure. This is represented by the 'Defect Expectations' on the map. The 
subject also made comments accurately linking an increase in staff to a decline in productivity, 
which would naturally increase cost. This is seen as the link from workforce experience to 
productivity in the nominal model (Figure 4). This appeared to be the basis for his unwillingness 
to add people late in the project. He also identified a tradeoff between staff and schedule which 
was partially accurate. He stated that a requirements increase could be addressed by either a staff 
increase or a schedule increase. He failed to note however, that an increase in staff could also 
lead to a schedule increase, especially late in the project. 
Summary. At no time in the simulation was it clear that this subject understood 
the relationships between cost and schedule. In fact, he frequently used the concepts of days and 
person-days interchangeably. Many of his decisions seemed to be based on a gut feeling rather 
than a complete understanding of the relationships. QA decisions didn't seem to stem from a 
clear plan. Following the simulation, he commented that his overall QA strategy was to keep it 
within the range offered by the simulation as normal (5-20 defects per kdsi). At one point during 
the simulation, he compared QA expenditures to defect density. There was no evidence however 
that he understood the cost benefits of early detection, nor did he ever completely analyze the QA 
problem. Rather it seemed to be on the peripheral of his decision making. 
F.        SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS 
By considering the survey results, decision and outcome data, and the individual decision 
processes, several key issues are evident. 
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1. Ability to cope with system complexities 
Consistent with the literature, all of the subjects seemed to have difficulty in dealing with 
the complexities of the decision environment. They tended to deal only with small causal chains 
at a time, rarely connecting the chains to form the more complex causal webs which comprise the 
problem space. While some of the subjects mental models improved over the course of the 
project, true learning was frequently hampered by their misperceptions of the causal 
relationships. In several instances, subjects were observed to engage in justification of past 
decisions by forcing the current project status to fit into their causal model. This prevented them 
from seeing the actual relationships. 
2. Quality assurance most difficult 
While subjects had difficulty with all aspects of the project, the QA subsystem seemed to 
be the most perplexing. Subject 7 clearly voiced an understanding of the benefits of early 
detection, but clearly did not understand the costs of placing to great an emphasis on QA. 
Subject 9 had what was arguably the most effective strategy. He tried various QA levels and 
assessed the response of the defect density. Subject 1 felt that QA early was a waste of time. 
The remaining subjects placed little emphasis on QA or ignored it completely in their decision 
processes. 
3. Experience effects 
While seven subjects is an admittedly small sample, it appeared from this group that the 
more experienced managers made decisions differently than the others. Subjects 1 and 3 
particularly were less able to voice their thoughts. This may be due to the fact that their decision 
processes have been so internalized that they are difficult to verbalize. These subjects also 
seemed to make decisions more on trends than specific data. They did fewer calculations to 
support their decisions, preferring to make adjustments which corresponded to the trends. They 
also seemed to be less likely to make changes at all, preferring to let things go to see what 
happens. Interestingly, the most experienced subject, subject 1, was the one who advocated 
sliding QA efforts until the end of the programming phase. 
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4. Goal priorities 
The subjects were given the explicit goals of minimizing overruns in both cost and 
schedule. All of the data seems to indicate that the subjects placed a greater emphasis on 
schedule than cost. That is, they were more willing to go over budget than delay the delivery of 
the project. This was evident in the survey results, the decisions, and the outcomes. 
5. Other observations 
The survey results indicated subjects used the reports more than the graphs. The 
protocols indicate that those who used the graphs identified trends earlier. Subject 7 for 
example, never used the graphs at all. Had he looked at the plot of QA effort versus defect 
density he would have clearly seen that his effort was disproportionate to the defects detected. 
Others successfully used the status graph to identify when the growth rate had begun to decline. 
This potentially prevented them for adding further staff late in the project. 
It was also observed that many of the subjects did not immediately identify the 
requirements growth. This clearly seemed to effect their willingness to increase staff. Had they 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Software projects in both the public and private sectors have been plagued with an 
inability to meet budgets and deadlines. Inadequate management tools and a general lack of 
understanding of the decision processes involved in managing software projects are largely 
responsible for many of the problems experienced. 
The purpose of this research was to explore the decision processes of experienced 
software project managers. Towards that end an experiment was conducted which simulated the 
decision environment over the course of the project.  The experiment included the capture of 
managers' decision and performance data, and their decision processes. 
The results suggest that, consistent with the literature, managers have difficulty forming a 
complete mental model of the decision environment. The quality assurance subsystem posed an 
especially difficult problem. 
While subjects all generally had difficulty with the environment, decision processes 
varied substantially between subjects. The experience level of subjects seemed to be a predictor 
of some of the variance. Subjects with the most experience apparently had difficulty verbalizing 
their decision processes, made fewer changes, and based their decisions on general trends vice 
specific calculations. 
As would be expected, subjects refined their models of the decision environment as the 
management problem progressed. While learning from feedback was taking place, it was not 
clear that all learning was correct. In some instances, subjects seemed to adjust the feedback to 
fit their model of the environment rather than the other way around. This was frequently 
evidenced by the use of data to justify and rationalize past decisions. 
Finally, the results indicated that subjects placed a higher emphasis on meeting schedule 
deadlines than budget constraints. This was indicated both by the survey results, and the analysis 
of the decision processes themselves. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis and observations made, several recommendations are appropriate: 
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Conduct further research on the QA subsystem. The research can be tailored to 
developing strategies for dealing with the uncertainty of quality assurance, and 
assessing the effectiveness of training in quality assurance strategies. 
Conduct further research on the effects of varying degrees of experience on decision 
makers decision process. Particular emphasis should be placed on exploring how 
more experienced managers internalize their decision processes. 
Improve the visibility of the requirements changes in the simulation interface. 
Use simulation systems as training tools as well as research environments. Many of 
the subjects improved their understanding of the problem space in just this brief 
exposure. Comments indicated that they found the exercise useful and learned from it. 
Development of training environments could include more object-oriented metrics in 
the simulation interface to make it compatible with current development 
environments. 
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1.      In making your decisions, how much weight out of 100 points did you accord to the 




2. How clear were the instructions regarding the task? 
1 23456789 
Not at all Very 
Clear Clear 
3. To what extent were the graphs of the progress of the project helpful in improving your 
decisions? 
1 23456789 
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4. To what extent were the reports on the progress of the project helpful in improving your 
decisions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all Very 
Helpful HelPfal 
5. Please give us some information about yourself (in absolute confidence. At no time will 
your name appear in the results. The data will only be used in an aggregate statistical 
sense). 
a. Age  (check one) 
_under30    30-35   _36-40 _41-45  „46-50  51-55 _over 55 
b. Work experience: 
1.) Have you in the past participated in project management (Y/N)?  
2.) If YES, to what extent was the task in this simulation similar to your previous 
experience? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all VeiT 
Similar similar 
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4.) Please relate your project managment experience to the best ofyour 
recollection. 
For project type, specify Embedded, Organic, Semi-detached or other. 
Embedded systems refer to those systems where the interfaces are rigidily 
defined, complex and inflexible (e.g., weapons systems). 
Organic systems are on the other end of the spectrum, having unrestrictive 
interfaces (e.g., administrative systems). 
Semi-detached are  somewhere  in the middle  in terms  of rigidity  and 
complexity of interfaces. 
If other, explain. 
For language, list the language (FORTRAN, C, ADA, etc.). 
For  platform,  list  the  platform  used,   (e.g.   super-computer,   mainframe, 
workstation, PC, etc.). 
For project size, specify in delivered source instructions and/or staff size. 
Project 
Type 


























c. Education. Please provide your educational background. 
Degree Level Area of Study Date 




d. How many hours (per week) do you use computers? 
6. Your general comments regarding the simulation (use back if needed): 
***   END OF SIMULATION   *** 




5.) Please relate your experience as a developer, again to the best of your 
recollection. 
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Subj # Cost! Instruction Graphs Reports Age Task Year Type of Software Project Education Computer 
Schedule Clarity Helpful Helpful Similarity sExp Management Experience Summary Hours/ 
Weights (O=no exp) Week 
1 40/60 9 3 9 over 4 18 Semi-detached; FORTRAN, BS(Edu)/ over 20 
55 BASIC, C/C++; Mainframe, MS(Metro) 
PC, Workstation 
2 60/40 7 4 8 41-45 0 0 No management, development AA/(CS) 30 
only 
3 50/50 8 8 8 over 7 23 Semi-detached; FORTRAN; BS/MS/ 10 
55 Mainframe, Super-Computer PrePhD 
4 40/60 9 7 9 under 0 0 None BS(PhySci)/ 40 
30 MS(Ocean) 
5 50/50 9 1 9 41-45 8 7 Organic; C, FORTRAN, BS(HRlCS) 20 
Assembly;PC, Workstation. 




6 40/60 9 6 8 over 3 5 Embedded; FORTRAN, Ada: BS/MS(Phy)/ 40 ! 
55 Mainframe, Workstation MS(Met) 
7 20/80 8 5 8 41-45 6 12 Semi-detached; FORTRAN; BS(Ocean)/ 35 
Super-Computer MS(Metro) 




9 30170 9 7 7 46-50 7 3 Semi-detached; FORTRAN, BS(Geol)/MS 10-15 
Ada, C; Workstation (CompSci)/ 
MS(Metro) 
10 30170 9 8 9 51-55 5 10 Embedded; FORTRAN; BS(Geo)/ 20 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The exercise you are about to undertake is similar in many ways to flight simulators that 
pilots use to mimic flying an aircraft from takeoff at point A to landing at point B. Instead of 
flying an aircraft, though, the simulator mimics the programming phase of a real software 
project. In this simulation, you will be more than an observer. In fact, you will play the role of 
manager of the programming phase of the project. Specifically, your role will be to track the 
progress of the project by reviewing status reports and graphs available every two-month interval 
(40 working days) during the programming phase. As the manager, you must then make two 
staffing decisions: 
1. The total number of staff you need. (You can hire additional staff, or decrease the 
staffing level as you deem necessary to complete your programming task successfully.) 
2. Decide what percent of your total staff to allocate to the Quality Assurance activity to 
be conducted throughout the programming phase (e.g. to do inspections). 
B. PROJECT 
The project that you will manage happens to have been a real project conducted in a real 
organization. For the project, you will be given a project profile containing the following initial 
information: 
• Estimated Size of the System: in Delivered Source Instructions (DSI) 
• Estimated Cost of Programming Phase:      in Number of Person Days 
• Estimated Duration of Programming Phase: in Number of Work Days 
• Size of initial Core Team: in People 
The Core Team is a skeleton staff of software professionals who are there to ensure 
continuity between the requirements/design phase (which you may assume has just been 
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- ----------------------------------------_ ...... 
The cost and schedule estimates are derived from a new off-the-shelf estimation tool, call 
it "NEWJTOOL", that has been recently acquired. 
Historically, the defect density (i.e. number of defects detected during programming 
divided by the number of KDSI developed) has ranged from 5 - 20 Defects/KDSI. 
C. YOUR TASK 
Your task at every 40-day interval is to review the project's status, and make any 
necessary adjustments to the staffing level and its allocation. In order to do so, you may feel that 
is necessary to first adjust the project's cost and duration targets. The staffing decision should be 
done as follows: 
1. Decide on the total staffing level, and 
2. Decide on what percentage of the staff should be allocated to the quality assurance 
function (i.e. a number between 0 and 100). 
D. YOUR GOAL FOR THE TASK IS TWOFOLD: 
E.        SOME IMPORTANT POINTS TO CONSIDER IN MANAGING YOUR TASK 
1. As the manager of the programming phase, you specify the desired staffing level. You 
may find that your actual staffing level (as it will appear in the reports) is different from 
what you requested. This would be due to factors you cannot control, such as hiring 
delays and turnover. 
2. The staff size that you select, and which appears in reports, may show fractions (e.g. 
4.5 people) since people are allowed to work on more than one project. 
3. When requesting additional staff, expect a delay in hiring. For modest additions to 
your staffing, the average hiring delay will be around 40 days. However, if you request a 
large number of additional staff, the average hiring delay will be much longer. 
4. Once new people are hired, they must be trained and assimilated. The 
assimilation/training period is typically 80 days. During this assimilation/training period 
you can expect the new employee to be only half as productive as an experienced 
employee. 
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5. Adding more people increases communication and coordination overhead as happens 
in reality. 
F. RULES OF THE GAME 
1. If you have a question, ask the lab attendant. 
2. You are not allowed to bring any notes to use during the simulation. Feel free to write 
on the documentation sheets provided. 
3. A calculator is allowed and recommended. 
G. INSTRUCTIONS FOR STARTING THE SYSTEM 
Follow the instructions Carefully.  If any problems arise, immediately seek out the lab 
attendant. 
1. Insert the disk into the B: drive. Do not remove the disk from the drive. 
2. From the C:\ prompt, type B: 
3. Start the simulation by typing START at the B:\ prompt. 
4. Follow the instructions as they appear on the screen. 
5. The simulation is complete when the % Programming Reported Complete in the 
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REMEMBER YOUR GOALS ARE: 




Project Duration (start-end) 
15,860 DSI 
















Initial Decision 944 272 
Time Elapsed - 40 Days 
Time Elapsed - 80 Days 
Time Elapsed -120 Days 
Time Elapsed-160 Days 
Time Elapsed - 200 Days 
Time Elapsed - 240 Days 
Time Elapsed - 280 Days 
Time Elapsed - 320 Days 
Time Elapsed - 360 Days 
Time Elapsed - 400 Days 
Time Elapsed - 440 Days 
Time Elapsed - 480 Days 
Time Elapsed - 520 Days 
**** WHEN YOU ARE DONE, CALL THE LAB ATTENDANT *** 
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APPENDIX C 
A.       THE CODING SCHEME 
1. The Trial Experiment 
As mentioned previously, a trial experiment was conducted prior to running the 
experiment on the 10 expert subjects. The purpose of the trial experiment was twofold. First, to 
gain experience and evaluate the mechanics of the experiment. For this reason, the same 
procedures were followed in the trial experiment as the final experiment. Second, and more 
importantly, to obtain a protocol for use in the development of a coding scheme. 
The subject for the trial experiment was selected based upon both his education and 
experience. As a graduate student in Information Technologies Management, the subject had 
received formal education in the field of software engineering. Combined with his experience as 
a professional software developer, this education provided an appropriate background in the 
domain area, and eminently qualified him as a subject for this experiment. 
2. Developing the Code 
Coding categories were developed by analyzing the single subject protocol from the trial 
experiment. To allow greater flexibility in the coding of the protocols, the coding scheme was 
segmented into categories, actions on categories, and up to two modifiers of each category/action 
combination. Video was used to clarify a subject's intent when statements alone were 
insufficient, or to otherwise establish the context of a statement. 
There were a total of seven categories used: Information, Goal, Decision, Link, Task, 
Execute, and Remark. The bulk of the substance is contained in the first four categories, with the 
last three providing administrative detail. Each category and its associated actions, modifiers, 
and abbreviations are described below, followed by a summary and a description of modifier 
types. In some cases, examples are given to provide clarification. Reference to Appendix ??? 
will provide further illustration of the use of the various codes. 
a. Information (I) 
The Information or T category was used on all statements which dealt directly 





information,   their   abbreviations,   modifiers,   and   descriptions   are   listed   in  the   format: 
Abbreviation - Action (Modifier 1, Modifier 2): Description. 
• A - Acquire (Data Point, Source): Details specific information acquired 
and the location of the data (report or graph). 
• M - Manipulate (Data Point, Operation): Indicates the data resulting 
from some operation. 
• E - Evaluate (Data Point, Result): Indicates some analysis of a data 
point, and the general result (hi, low, or acceptable). 
• R - Recall (Data Point, Period): Indicates recall of a previously known 
data point, and the period from which it was recalled (current period, 
previous period, first period, etc.). 
The   following   excerpt   from  the  trial   subject   illustrates   the   acquisition, 
manipulation, and evaluation of information: 
We've got - project size has gone up again to 24346. 
STATEMENT 
So at 24346 minus 18635 

















The first statement indicates both the acquisition and evaluation of the project's size (MODI = 
SIZE). It was acquired from a report (MOD2 = REP), and the result of the evaluation was that it 
had gone up (MOD2 = UP). The next statement indicates the acquisition of the delivered source 
instructions (MODI = DSI) from a report, followed by a manipulation of previously acquired or 
recalled variables to produce remaining source instructions (MODI = RSI) using the subtraction 
operator (MOD2 = SUB). An information recall would be similar to acquisition, but used on 
information that had already been acquired, and was simply being recalled. 
c. Goal(G) 
The Goal or 'G' category was used to code all statements dealing directly with one 
of the two goals, schedule and cost. Actions on goals, their abbreviations, modifiers, and 
descriptions are listed in the format: Abbreviation - Action (Modifier 1, Modifier 2): 
Description. 
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• U - Update (Goal, Change): Indicates a conscious adjustment or 
reaffirmation of one of the two goals, and the direction of change (up, 
down, or no change) since the last time the goal was visited, either the 
last update or the last finalization. 
• R - Recall (Goal, Period): Indicates a recall of a previous goal and the 
period ofthat goal. 
• J - Justify (Goal): Indicates an attempt to rationalize or justify an 
action on a goal. 
• E - Evaluate (Goal): Indicates some evaluation of a goal against actual 
performance. 
• F - Finalize (Goal, Change): Indicates finalization of a goal for that 
period, and the change from the last periods final goal. 
The following example illustrates a goal sequence from the trial subject's protocol. 
STATEMENT CAT ACT MODI MOD2 
Simply for simplicity for this round, I'm going to go ahead and 
leave the estimated duration constant and not alter it as well. 
G U SKED NC 
I don't want to alter too many variables at one time or I won't 
be able to tell what is effecting what. 
G J SKED 
I'm going to go ahead and bump my staff up because the size 
of the project has already increased. So 6 people 
D I RSTAF UP 
times 272 days G R SKED t-1 
gives us a budget of 1632 person days G U COST UP 
which is already an overrun of roughly 73% increase in cost. G E COST 
The sequence indicates an update to the schedule goal in which the subject chooses not to change 
the schedule. This is followed by a justification for the choice. The subject then makes a 
staffing decision, followed by a recall of the schedule goal from the prior period (t-1). This 
information is then used to update the cost goal and evaluate that update. Shortly after this 
sequence, the goals for the period were finalized (see Appendix A). 
d. Decision (D) 
The Decision or 'D' category was used on all statements which dealt directly with 
either of the two decisions, total staff or percent of staff allocated to QA. Actions on decisions, 
their abbreviations and modifiers are listed in the format: Abbreviation - Action (Modifier 1, 
Modifier 2): Description. 
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• I - Initialize (Decision, Change): Indicates the initial decision of a 
period and the change from the previous decision. 
• A - Adjust (Decision, Change): Indicates a conscious adjustment or 
reaffirmation of one of the two decisions, and the direction of change 
(up, down, or no change). 
• R - Recall (Decision, Period): Indicates a recall of a previous decision 
and the period ofthat decision. 
• J - Justify (Decision): Indicates an attempt to rationalize or justify an 
action on a decision. 
• F - Finalize (Decision, Change): Indicates finalization of a decision for 
that period, and the change from the last periods final decision. 
Examples of decision statements are similar to those of goals with one exception. The 'update' 
action from the 'goal' category was essentially broken down into initialize, and adjust. This was 
done to better account for the more structured decision sequences. Appendix A provides 
numerous specific examples of the coding of decision statements. 
e. Link (L) 
The Link or 'L' category was used to denote statements where the subject 
identified a causal link between two data points. Two distinctions were made in the actions, 
shallow vs. deep, and accurate vs. inaccurate. Patterned after Schweiger (1985), these 
distinctions allow closer scrutiny of subjects' causal analysis. 
'Shallow* indicates an analysis only one level deep. For example, the statement, 
"but the workforce is 81% experienced - that contributes to the productivity being so high.", 
indicates identification of a shallow link between workforce experience and productivity. A deep 
link could be multiple levels deep or linking two causes to one effect. Using the previous 
example, if the subject had also tied in staff size (and the corresponding communication 
overhead) to productivity, the analysis would be classified as deep. If deep causal analysis is 
identified, additional data points can be included in additional modifiers as necessary. 
The 'accuracy' of the subjects analysis is also captured in the coding scheme. A 
code of'accurate' indicates a match between the causal relationship the subject identified and the 
software dynamics model, while 'inaccurate' indicates the causal link identified by the subject did 
70 
· I - I itialize ( ecisi , a e): I icates t e i itial isi  f  
eri   t  e fr  t  re i s cisi . 
·  - j st ( isi , ): I i t s  s i s j st t r 
r ffir ti  f  f t  t  i i s,  t  ir ti  f  
( , , r  ). 
 ll i i , ri ): i t   r ll f  r i  i i  
 t  ri  f that i i . 
·  i  i  t  t li   j tif   
   






   
  l   i    
 t  ti ,  l i    l  .    
i ti i , iti l t  i t    i l  i  iti l i i   . 
 ' ' t  s j t  l is is ls  t  i  t  i  s .  
  ' ' i i t   t  t  t  l r l ti i  t  s j t i tifi   t  
s ft r  a ics l, ile 'i r t ' i ic t s t  ca s l li  i tifi   t e s j t i  
70 
not match the model. It is important to note that the 'accuracy' is not a judgment of correctness, 
but rather a comparison to an existing model of the environment. 
In some cases, the subject only indicated an awareness of a causal relationship, 
but not an actual identification of the linkage. This awareness is also captured in the coding 
scheme as described below. Actions on goals, their abbreviations, modifiers, and descriptions 
are listed in the format: Abbreviation - Action (Modifier 1, Modifier 2): Description. The two 
modifiers were used to identify the data points or variables involved; the first being the 'cause, 
and the second being the 'effect'. 
• IDSA - Identify Shallow Accurate (Data Point, Data Point): Used when a 
subject identified a shallow causal relationship between two variables, and the 
relationship matched the model. 
• IDSI - Identify Shallow Inaccurate (Data Point, Data Point): Used when the 
subject identified a shallow relationship which did not match the model. 
• IDDA - Identify Deep Accurate (Data Point, Data Point, etc.): Used when a 
subject identified a deep causal relationship between multiple variables, and 
the relationship matched the model. 
• IDDI - Identify Deep Inaccurate (Data Point, Data Point, etc.): Used when a 
subject identified a deep relationship between multiple variables, but the 
relationship did not match the model. 
• ID - Identify (Data Points optional): Indicates subject was aware of a causal 
relationship, but was not sure or not clear about the details of the linkage. 
/ Task(T) 
The Task or T category was used with only one action, that is, Select (S). This 
category action had no modifiers and was used simply to denote statements in which the subject 
chose the next task to act on. For example, "See how staffing's doing.", is merely a comment by 
the subject to indicate what they will do next. 
g. Execute (E) 
The Execute or 'E' category simply provided a break between periods to facilitate 
single period data analysis. No actions or modifiers were used. In cases where the subject didn't 










h. Remark (REM) 
The Remark or 'REM' category was used to code statements that had no relevance 
or were redundant. No actions or modifiers were used. 
L Coding Summary 
Table 2 provides a summary of the coding categories, actions and modifiers used 
in coding the protocols. 




Information (I) Acquisition (A) Data Point Source 
Manipulation (M) Data Point Operation 
Evaluate (E) Data Point Result 
Recall (R) Data Point Period 
Goal (G) Update (U) Goal Change 
Recall (R) Goal Time 
Justify (J) Goal 
Evaluate (E) Goal 
Finalize (F) Goal Change 
Decision (D) Initialize (I) Decision Change 
Adjust (A) Decision Change 
Recall (R) Decision Time 
Justify (J) Decision 
Finalize (F) Decision Change 
Link (L) Identify Shallow Accurate (IDSA) Data Point Data Point 
Identify Shallow Inaccurate (IDSI) Data Point Data Point 
Identify Deep Accurate (IDDA) Data Point Data Point 
Identify Deep Inaccurate (IDDI) Data Point Data Point 
Identify (ID) Optional Data Points 
Task (T) Select (S) 
Execute (E) 
Remark (REM) 
 .  
Table 2. Coding Summary 
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h. Remark (RE ) 
The Remark or 'REM' category was used to code statements that had no relevance 
or were redundant. No actions or modifiers were used. 
i. Coding Su ry 
Table 2 provides a su ary of the coding categories, actions and odifiers used 
in coding the protocols. 
R  I N IFIER IFIER 
 TYPE 2 PE 
Infor ation (I) c isition ( ) ata int ource 
i lation ( ) ta i t peration 
l te ( ) ta i t es lt 
ll ( ) t  i t eriod 
Goal (G) t   l hange 
ll ( ) l i e 
J stif  (1) l 
l t   l 
i li   l hange 
ecision ( ) iti li  isi  hange 
j t ( ) isi  hange 
ll ( ) isi  i e 
tif  ( ) ecisi  
i li   isi  hange 
Link (L) I ti l t (l t  i t ata Point 
I ti  ll I r t  (I I) t  i t ata Point 
I e tif  e  cc r t  (I ) at  i t ata Point 
Identif  ee  Inacc rat  (I I) at  oi t ata Point 
Identif  (I ) ptional ata Points 
Task (T) Select (S) 
Execute (E) 
Re ark (RE ) 
Table 2. Coding Summary 
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j. Modifiers 
Table 3 contains an exhaustive list of all the possible values for each of the 
modifiers used and an associated description. 
MODIFIER VALUES DESCRIPTION 
DATA 
POINT 
STAFR Required staff 
CSTAF Current staff 
WFE Work force experienced 
TPRODR Total productivity required 
TPRODC Total productivity current 
IPRODR Individual productivity required 
IPRODC Individual productivity current 
SIZE Total requirements (delivered source instructions) 
DD Defect density 
NDD Normal defect density 
PDEXP Person days expended 
%COMP Percent of requirements completed 
INCSZ Percent increase in project size (requirements) 
HDEL Hiring delay 
DR Days remaining based on elapsed time and estimated schedule 
PSI Projected source instructions with current staffing, productivity, 
and days remaining 
DSI Delivered source instructions 
RSI Remaining source instructions left to deliver 
TMELAP Time elapsed 
SOURCE REP Report 
GRAPH Graph 




Table 3. Modifiers 
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Higher than expected 
Lower than expected 
As expected or acceptable 





General case (used with GOAL RECALL) 
Pertaining to the cost goal 
Pertaining to the schedule goal 
Requested staff 
Percent of staff allocated to QA 
Table 3 (continued). Modifiers 
3. Coding the Protocol 
To further illustrate the coding process, the single-subject protocol and the codes for each 
statement are included in Table 4. For reasons of anonymity and space, this is the only protocol 
included in its entirety. 
4. Using the Coded Protocol 
From the coded protocol, a number of analysis can be conducted. Many of these were 
introduced in Chapter II, including frequency analysis and transition analysis. Frequency 
analysis entails determining the frequency each task can be performed. Transition analysis is 
concerned with the sequence tasks are performed in. This can be expended to include an analysis 
of which tasks preceded and followed each task category. By adding a time element to the code, 
a task duration analysis can be conducted. By using the above coding scheme in a spreadsheet, 
these analyses can be semi-automated. The hierarchical nature of the scheme lends itself to 
analyses at varying degrees of granularity. 
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MODIFIER VALUES DESCRIPTION 
RESULT HI Higher than expected 
LO Lower than expected 
OK As expected or acceptable 
CONV Change the units or form of the data 
PERIOD t Cu rent period 
t-l Previous period 
to First period 
P xperience 
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L  rt i i  t  t  st al 
 rt i i  t  t  le l 
E ISI   t  ff 
 t   t    
 
. i  t  t l 
included in its entirety. 
. i  t   l 
r  t   r t l,  r l i  t . t   
i tr  i  a t r II, i cl i  fre uency a al si   tr iti  l si . r  
analysis entails deter ining the frequency eac  tas  ca   erf r . ra siti  a al sis is 
concerned ith the sequence tasks are perfor ed in. his can be expen e  to incl e a  analysis 
of hich tasks preceded and fol owed each task category. y adding a ti e ele ent to the code, 
a task duration analysis can be conducted. By using the above coding sche e in a spreadsheet, 
these analyses can be semi-automated. The hierarchical nature of the sche e lends itself to 









Subject 1 - Initial Decision 





| Density [ 
Current 
Staff % WFE I 
75 










t  i l i  
~ 
.- .. -.. 
 4
Subject 1 - 80 days 
Defects 
Density | 






Tx \ /" 














...... ~ .... 
I r 
I Density ( .......... . 
















I Productivity! .......... ,% Completel 







































iProductivity] |% Complete] 
T 












III D').erl.fe;;:ctksl-/--.. • ~ ............ . 












j t  -   
Ipro ti it / 
Subject 1 - 320 days 








Ip ti it l 1  I 
.~ ......... .......... .... ' 
........ 
Snhject 3 - Initial Decision 
Rnh^r-t 3 - 40 days 
Density [-"" 








Subjec     
-.. -.. _ .. -.. -.. -.. -.. -.. -. 
. .... 
, ........... . 
. (!)~ .. 
I Defects I· ... 
-----~ 




' and perception^ 
of rptg errors 
Subject 3 - 80 days 
Current 
Rqmts 























1 Density f············· 
1 efects I .. ··· ..................... .. 
1 i f······· 
..... 
.......... 
. .. ., 
..... 




fand perception ( 
of rptg errors 






Staff | % WFE I 
Scpectatf 
'and perception^ 
of rptg errors 







I Defects I .... ·· 
I Density f··· 
...... 








A ~ .. 
~- .. -. 
82 
Subject 3 - 160 days 
1% Complete I 
. ........... -







Subject 6 - Initial Decision 
Initial 
Suggestion 
Subject 6 - 40 Days 











I Density f··················· 
...... 
.......... 






.- .. -.. 





Subject 6 - 80 Days 
Productivity % Time Used 
|% Complete] 















J Defects I···· ... · 
I Defects I··· 
........... 
















Subject 6 - 80 Days 
/% Complete/ 
ubject 6 - 120 ays 







Subject 6-160 Days 
Rqmts 
Completec 
Productivity % Time Used 
|% Complete] 


















1~/~.'m"l~ ® ~ ~emammg. ~_.L....~-<, 
, 
I Defects I ................ . 
..... 












. ......... . 
............ t~ 1 ~:;; 1 ___ '" 
I Current I 1% WFEJ ~U I . Staff. -~ • i .. _ .. -: ..... _ ..... _ ...................................................................... 1 
........ 
......... 
Subject 6 - 280 Days 
...... 
I Density r C9· ~ I Days I T. 
\ \ Req'd ---- (7\ 
I c~~~~ntl I%;F~U \ ~=-~~------------.~ .. ~--
................. - ........•.. -...... . 
\ 












I Density I" 
Q) ......... . 
;~- " ... h;\ U 
" ) O/OWFE) 
I )
......... 
Subject 7 - Initial Decision 
Subject 7-40 days 











1  1 
Subject 7 - 80 days 




1 Density ("" , 
\ 
.- ........•......... : 





'.. _ .. _ _ I % WFE I 
.................................... ;-.............. -.. ................ : 
 - 120 y





of rptg errors 
Current _^/E^     Rqmts 
Rqmts        \^J Completer: 
| Productivity 
Subject 7-160 days 




















1  1 
..•..•.. -
1% Complete 1 






Rqmts       K^J 
Productivity 
Subject 7 - 280 days 
% Time 
Used 
(~>\^^*\   Rqmts 

























Staff % WFE 
92 
.. , .. -.. 

























Subject 8-120 days 
|% Complete] 
~9T 
, .. ' .. 













Subject 8-160 days 
»Resources 
Expended 























to Change < 
Vorkforce 















...... .... C!) 1 Days 1 
,~ Req'd --- (7\ 
l%wjE1 - "V 
~···A .. ······· .. · 
.. -~. "v( 
.. . 
-----~.: ......... . 
.... 1 ""'D-e-n""'si-ty-I ••• • • • • •• .... \ 
.. ~ 
". . 1 ~:~,~ 1--- I I%~m--- ... CJ 
Initial 




Subject 9 - Initial Decision 









I Defects I 
.......... 
I Density r·· 
;~---., 







-" -" -.. ; ..... ~ .. -. 
, 






Subject 9 - 80 Days 




Subject 9-120 Days 
•5©< 









I Density r··· 
.... 



































Density | § 
% WFE 




Subject 9 - 200 Days 





I ensity r" 
I Density r····· 




•• fIIJ - ...... - ... 
. ' -'." 
j ct  -  ys 
.. ,- -"" 
.. 
, .. , ............ . ........ .. 
-"" " 








I~P-ro-d-u-ct-iv-it-yi 1% Completei 
-/-
~ 
L __________________________________ ~ 
98 





of rptg errors 















1 Density r 
1 (' 
" 
I Productivityl 1% Complete 1 
I r l 1.-----iExpend  
"~ 01 
---------:lo=Yo~~ _______ __ 
Iproductivityl 1  o plete I 
,0 C( I Days I 
Req'd --- 0 
1 %WFE 1 
Current 
Rqmts 





I Density r············ 
... ~ 
I C~~~~t r 
, 
." 
1 Productivityl 1  1 
(E) I Days I 
_'-i_\ , Req'd --C) 
1 % WFEJ---- .. 














Subject 10-80 Days 
Density | 
 -©' 
Productivity! |% Complete] 
Subject 10-120 Days 








.. ~ ..... . 









~ta vest .........  .... "." .• eJ- .... -1> 
Subject 10 - 80 Days 
Iproductivityl 1% Complete I 
ubject 10 - 120 ays 
Iprod ctivityl 1  l t / 
I _______ J 
102 
Subject 10-160 Days 
|% Complete] 












a ••• ". 
, ," 
Via ?:y' Cost ' ,,' " . .. - , 
, 
104 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abdel-Hamid, T. K., "Investigating the Impacts of Managerial Turnover/Succession on Software 
Project Performance", Journal of Management Information Systems, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 127-44, 
Fall 1992. 
Abdel-Hamid, T. K., Madnick, S. E., "Lessons Learned from Modeling the Dynamics of 
Software Development", Communications of the ACM, vol. 32, no. 12, pp. 1426-38, Dec, 1989. 
Abdel-Hamid, T. K., Madnick, S. E., The Dynamics of Software Development - An Integrative 
Perspective of the Dynamic Interactions in Software Project Management, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1990. 
Abdel-Hamid, T. K., Sengupta, K., Ronan. D., "Software Project Control: An Experimental 
Investigation of Judgment with Fallible Information", IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 603-612, Jun., 1993. 
Adelman, L., Gualtieri, J., Stanford, S., "Examining the Effect of Causal Focus on the Option 
Generation Process: An Experiment Using Protocol Analysis", Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Making, vol. 61, no. 6, pp. 54-66,1995. 
Baker, D. L., An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Software Size increase on Software 
Project Management Behavior, M. S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 
Mar., 1992. 
Bosley, M. J., An Experimental Investigation of Time Delays in Software Project Staffing, M. S. 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Jun., 1994. 
Brooks, F. P. Jr., The Mythical Man-Month, Reading, Addison-Wesley Publishing, MA, 1975. 
Camerer, C. F., Johnson, E. J., "The Process-Performance Paradox in Expert Judgment", Toward 
a General Theory of Expertise, edited by Ericsson and Smith, Chapter 8, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
Carroll, J. S., Johnson, E. J., Decision Research - A Field Guide, Sage Publications, Newbury 
Park, California, 1990. 
Ericsson, K. A., Simon, H. A., Protocol Analysis - Verbal Reports as Data, The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984. 
Ford, J. K., Schmitt, N., Schechtman, S. L., Hults, B. M., Doherty, M. L., "Process Tracing 
Methods: Contributions, Problems, and Neglected Research Questions", Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decison Processes, no. 43, pp. 75-117, 1989. 
Funke, J., "Solving Complex Problems: Exploration and Control of Complex Systems", Chapter 
6 of Complex Problem Solving Principles and Mechanisms, edited by Sternberg and French, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1991. 
GAO, Automated Information Systems - Schedule Delays and Cost Overruns Plague DoD 






GAO, DoD's CAL Initiative, Report AIMD-94-197R, September 30,1994. 
Hardebeck, M. J., Decision Making for Software Project Management in a Multi-project 
Environment: An Experimental Investigation, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, September, 1991. 
Kitfield, J., "Is Software DoD's Achilles Heel?", Military Forum, July 1989. 
Schweiger, D. M., Anderson, C. R., Locke, E. A., "Complex Decision Making: A Longitudinal 
Study of Process and Performance", Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making 
Processes, vol. 36, pp. 245-272, 1985. 
Sterman, J. D., Learning in and About Complex Systems, Sloan School of Management, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. 
Svenson, O., "Eliciting and Analyzing Verbal Protocols in Process Studies of Judgment and 
Decision Making", Process and Structure in Human Decision Making, edited by Montgomery 
and Svenson, Chapter 4, John Wiley and Sons Ltd., New York, New York, 1989. 
Swett, C. L., An Experimental Investigation of the Impact of Conflicting Project Goals on Staff 






Brehmer, B., Lovborg, L., and Winman, A., Learning the Time Constants of a Dynamic Task, 
Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Roskilde, WPCS-92-6, November 1992. 
Gibbs, B. J., Hogarth, R. M., Marquis, M. A., McKenzie, C. R. M., "Learning from Feedback: 
Exactingness and Incentives", Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and 
Cognition, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 734-752, 1991. 
Morecroft, J. D. W., "System Dynamics and Microworlds for Policy Makers", European Journal 
of Operational Research, vol. 35, pp. 301-320, 1988. 
Pennington, N., Lee, A. Y., Rehder, B., "Cognitive Activities and Levels of Abstraction in 
Procedural and Object-Oriented Design", Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 10, pp. 171-226, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995. 
Roschelle, J., Pea, R., and Trigg, R., Videonoter: A Tool for Exploratory Video Analysis, Institute 
for Research on Learning, IRL Report No. IRL90-0021, March 1990. 
Sengupta, K., Abdel-Hamid, T. K., "Alternative Conceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision 
Environment", Management Science, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 411-428, Apr., 1993. 
Sengupta, K., Abdel-Hamid, T. K., "The Impact of Unreliable Information on the Management 




r, ., , .,  , ., i  t  0/ i  
tr   iti  i , it  , , r . 
, 1., t , ., i , . ., i , . ., i   : 
ti ss  ti ,  0/ i t l l  i ,   
. , , . , . 
, . , t     i  ,  
/ l , . , . , . 
, ,  ,        
     , , 
   . 
,     f ,  
   
       
 
108 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
3. Dr. Tarek Abdel-Hamid 2 
Department of Systems Management 
Code SM/Ah 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey California 93943-5002 
4. Dr. Kishore Sengupta 2 
Department of Systems Management 
Code SM/Se 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5002 
5.  Dr. Balasubranianiam Ramesh  
Department of Systems Management 
Code SM/Ra 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943-5002 
LCDR Douglas W. Swanson. 
131 Silverwood 







6.  ...................................................................................... 2 
